Knowledge and skills

This part of the local approach is about gathering, transferring and maintaining knowledge and skills to identify radicalisation processes and to enable interventions. Effective preventive policy, for example, requires knowledge of breeding grounds and the risk and protective factors that make individuals susceptible or unsusceptible to extremist views. Lessons learned from previous policy or interventions also contribute to this endeavour.

Municipalities use the knowledge about the different forms of extremism and information about the local threat to organise the local approach for the specific municipality or region. Knowledge is therefore an essential component for the local approach and that knowledge needs to be continuously updated and the level maintained even in the absence of indicators or cases.

Gathering knowledge is a continuous process which requires an ongoing effort in order to gain the support of professionals for current developments and phenomena relevant to them. What exactly a professional needs to know and is able to do depends on the role of the professional in question and the organisation, and on the regional context. Some municipalities, for example, specifically train their cleaning teams to recognise extremist and terrorist symbols or stickers in public spaces and indicators like these help to form a better picture of the sentiments that exist in the municipality concerned.

Basic knowledge

A basic knowledge of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism is relevant for a broad group of professionals in (semi-)public organisations, meaning not only radicalisation policy officers but also professionals working as dedicated post holders in healthcare, education, youth work, the police, or social neighbourhood teams. Although their primary task is not to prevent radicalisation, they may come across indicators of radicalisation in their daily work.

This basic knowledge covers:

  • familiarity with the meaning of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism;
  • knowledge of the distinction between activism and extremism;
  • insight into how radicalisation processes develop, the factors that influence them and when and where to report them;
  • awareness of the various manifestations of extremism which, as evidenced by such documents as the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN), pose the most (violent) threat;
  • familiarity with the basic elements of the local approach.

In-depth knowledge

Dossier holders, process coordinators and other professionals whose primary task is to prevent and tackle radicalisation, extremism and terrorism are expected to have more in-depth knowledge of different types of threats and their associated manifestations.

Besides knowledge of radicalisation and extremism, skills are also important. Training courses are available which focus on the skills needed to interact with target groups and how to deal with extreme ideals.

Sources of information

Training courses provided by the National Training Institute Against Radicalisation (ROR) are available to professionals to help them lay the right foundation and gain more in-depth knowledge. The training courses provided cover the basics, themes, skills and target groups.

Professionals can also increase their knowledge by studying recent publications published by scientific institutions such as the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC), partners like the National Extremism Support Centre (LSE), the Social Stability Expertise Unit (ESS), TerInfo and the Symbols Database (SymbolenBank). Various guides are also published by the ESS or the NCTV to help professionals take the right course of action.

Symbols Database

The Symbols Database has been developed for the police, municipal officials, youth workers, or other professionals who may come across extremist symbols in their work. The database helps people to recognise these symbols or expressions so that professionals can act on them, in accordance with their own agreements or procedures.

Additional information

In addition to sources of knowledge, additional information is provided by the intelligence and security services, for example in the form of the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN) which is published by the NCTV and the annual reports of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). These publications describe phenomena such as right-wing extremism, the sovereignty movement, or jihadism and (threat) developments which are relevant for national security. The police can provide information on regional or local threats and can link phenomena to observations at local or regional level (local or regional threat assessment). More and more municipalities are commissioning a university or other knowledge institute to conduct a regional phenomenon analysis or quick scan to provide insight into the threat in that specific region. Some municipalities employ analysts who are able to conduct such regional analyses.

The (threat) intelligence from national to local level underpins the local approach in order to align it with the demands posed by the threat.

Example - creating administrative support using the North Netherlands Phenomenon Analysis (Fenomeenanalyse Noord Nederland):

With the help of reinforcement funds from the state, as granted by NCTV, the University of Groningen conducted a phenomenon analysis to identify the regional dimension of extremism in the northern Netherlands. The northern provinces are characterised by region-specific issues (gas extraction, wind turbines, asylum seekers' centres), so there are regional nuances when compared to the national threat assessment. The study serves as a baseline measurement with which to continue shaping the local approach in the northern Netherlands. It is also a useful tool for local partners and administrators to increase knowledge about the different manifestations in the region and to create support.

The phenomenon analysis forms the basis for testing and organising local policy based on the threat at the local level.

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