Phase 1: Prevention
Prevention starts with promoting resilience and resistance throughout society. Such broad prevention reinforces protective factors and reduces breeding grounds for, among other things, radicalisation and therefore aligns with programmes that promote well-being, coexistence or democratic citizenship in a general sense. However, the sole focus of these activities is not on radicalisation. As far as municipalities are concerned this means that prevention is not only an issue for the security domain, but also closely linked to the social, education and care domains, as well as other societal programmes (such as the National Liveability and Safety Programme (NPLV), the Regional Information and Expertise Centres (RIECs) or Prevention with Authority).
Within the framework of comprehensive prevention, the Resilient and Resistant Society Agenda (Agenda Veerkrachtige en Weerbare Samenleving) aims to provide municipalities, professionals and civil society organisations with knowledge and tools to increase the resilience and resistance of individuals and groups. The Resilient and Resistant Society Agenda does this by, for example, focusing locally on (developing) interventions aimed at preventive protective factors.
The Social Stability Expertise Unit (ESS) focuses on strengthening social stability and, with that, resilience in society in relation to social tensions, polarisation, prevention of subversion and radicalisation. The ESS is in continuous dialogue with the state, municipalities, communities and professionals on these issues. It links them, identifies indicators, ensures that issues are placed on various agendas and offers tailor-made advice, for example by setting up and maintaining (informal) networks, strengthening action skills and organising dialogue with society. You can reach the Unit via ESS@minszw.nl.
Another example relating to broad prevention concerns the inter-governmental Social Unrest Support Network (OMO). This network supports local and national government in dealing with discontent, polarisation and unrest. You can contact the network (via omo@minbzk.nl) if you need advice or support in relation to (imminent) unrest caused by social issues or in the run-up to a decision which you expect will generate a passionate response. Rather than being an extension of activism, extremism is substantially different.
Because this form of prevention is so broad and general, and there is no direct causal line from civil unrest and all kinds of activism to extremism and terrorism, it is not discussed in any additional detail in this guide. The local approach to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism focuses on targeted prevention. In practice, broad and targeted prevention may overlap.
Targeted preventive efforts within the context of the local approach involve supporting the resilience and resistance of groups and individuals whose circumstances may make them more susceptible to extremist thinking.
There is no blueprint for identifying the reasons why individuals do or do not become radicalised. The extent to which individuals are susceptible or resilient to extremist messages is determined by an interplay between a multitude of factors, such as general breeding grounds, specific risk and protective factors, or social stability in the country. Personal characteristics (such as gender, age, education level, income and mental disorders) and factors surrounding the individual (such as discrimination, marginalisation, certain friends, or an identity crisis) can play a role in the radicalisation process. Promoting protective factors, such as social skills, self-empowerment and family support, helps to combat radicalisation.
Objective and description
Objective
The overall objective in this prevention phase is to stop individuals from becoming radicalised or continuing their process of radicalisation. With this in mind, the focus is on the following:
- Gaining an insight into susceptible individuals in susceptible environments and/or individuals located in municipalities.
- Implementing projects and interventions for susceptible groups and/or individuals aimed at strengthening protective factors.
- Increasing insight into effective preventive interventions targeting these groups and/or individuals.
- Strengthening and maintaining knowledge, skills, confidence and cooperation in the network.
- Evaluating and fine-tuning interventions.
- Building administrative support for the long-term effective organisation of the preventive approach.
In order to achieve the above objectives it is important that chain partners from the social, education, care and security domains work together closely.
Description
The preventive phase consists of building a network of partners (professionals and civil society), combined with preventive interventions/projects initiated by these partners.
Knowledge and skills
What a professional needs to know and is able to do varies depending on the regional context, profession and organisation. Effective preventive policies are based on knowledge of the different forms of extremism and its motives and manifestations, because that knowledge is required in order to target individuals or groups who are susceptible to different forms of extremism. The decision regarding where an intervention is needed can be made by consulting the local information picture and information from the local network. This allows targeted and substantiated consideration of which preventive activities best align and how they should be prioritised.
Professionals involved in the preventive approach should at least have knowledge of breeding grounds and trigger factors, as well as the risk and protective factors relating to radicalisation. These factors may vary from one phenomenon to another. Skills training is also available, for example on professional judgement, dealing with extreme ideals and interview skills. Professionals can participate in these training courses provided by the National Training Institute Against Radicalisation (ROR).
Civil society can be informed through the municipality or other (security) partners in various ways, for example in the form of (lunch) lectures, theme days, masterclasses or the periodical references to background material.
Network
The prevention network in the context of the local approach is a collaboration between the security, social, education and care domains and civil society. This network is needed to create and maintain support for radicalisation prevention and it also plays a role in implementing preventive projects.
The municipality's security department can act as a source of information and sparring partner in the event of concerns or questions about possible radicalisation. The municipality can be supported in this respect by regional and national partners with specific expertise, such as an experienced local municipality, the local advisors of the NCTV, the ESS or the National Extremism Support Centre (LSE).
What does this network look like?
A preventive network consists of (front-line) professionals who may come into contact with susceptible individuals in susceptible environments in their work. Radicalisation manifests itself in all corners of society and, depending on the threat, it is important to include the relevant partners in your network. A specific preventive network may be required depending on the threat and target group. This network may then be made up of, for example, professionals in the social, care, education and security domains, as well as major employers in the region. Youth workers, for instance, have an important role to play in prevention and the prevention of radicalisation can be an explicit part of their remit.
Speak the same language
Professionals view an issue from their own perspective and speak the language of their organisation. For example, the security domain often refers to a person as a 'case' or 'subject', while the social domain refers to a 'client'. The same goes for 'intervention' versus 'activity'. It is important to be aware of these differences. To ensure effective cooperation it may help to place radicalisation, extremism and terrorism on the agenda of a broader theme, such as 'positive identity'.
Post Holders Dedicated to Counterterrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation (CTER)
Value can be added by creating a network of post holders dedicated to CTER. A post holder dedicated to CTER is a professional who works for a network partner and who is trained in radicalisation and extremism. They function as sparring partners for colleagues, provide the municipality with specialised access within the organisation and can raise the profile of the issue more widely within their own organisation. For example, a post holder dedicated to CTER within a mental health institution performs an important bridging function between the mental health and security domains, while those who work on targeted prevention in the social, education and care domains (such as youth workers) should at least have knowledge of breeding grounds, trigger factors and risk and protective factors for radicalisation.
Civil society network and key figures
Besides the network of professionals, cooperation with civil society and key people in communities are also essential for prevention. Within the municipality this network consists of bridge builders between the municipality, professionals and residents, in other words, individuals with a certain standing and trust within the community. Examples could be foundations (sports, religion, activity support, etc.), community centres and committed individuals who play a connecting role in a neighbourhood or district. They can help to prevent various social problems and be involved in policymaking.
The publication entitled Overview of types of network (Overzicht netwerkvormen) describes the different types of network and can be used to choose the most appropriate network form based on the goal. The ESS handouts entitled How to deal with networks as partners (Hoe om te gaan met netwerken als samenwerkingspartner) and Working with communities through a network of key figures (Samenwerken met gemeenschappen via een netwerk van sleutelpersonen) offer additional insights.
Interventions
Preventive interventions, or activities, can help increase the resilience of susceptible groups and individuals in environments which are susceptible to radicalisation. These can be undertaken from within various professional fields. Stigmatisation can be avoided at this stage by addressing the topic of radicalisation, together with other themes (such as crime, subversion, ‘loverboys’, media literacy).
It is difficult to demonstrate how many cases of radicalisation have actually been avoided through preventive activities. Despite this so-called prevention paradox, previous evaluations of interventions did manage to shed light on which elements are important, how participants experienced interventions and what kind of results they generated. As far as municipalities are concerned, interventions are available that have proven effects on preventing radicalisation, such as parenting support, training and coaching for vulnerable young people and youth work aimed at preventing radicalisation. The Evidence Based Working Toolkit (EBW) to prevent radicalisation (Toolkit Evidence Based Werken (EBW) bij preventie van radicalisering) provides knowledge, lessons learned, useful checklists and formats to evaluate interventions.
Relevant activities and projects in this context are:
From the security domain:
- The establishment of a key figure network.
- The project that contributes to youth resilience to extremist influences and forms of problematic behaviour, for example by initiating discussions about sensitive topics (such as radicalisation) and building mutual understanding. This involves critical thinking, empathising with others, self-reflection, putting things into perspective and learning from each other.
- (Digital) neighbourhood policemen, special investigating officers (BOAs) who are specialised in young people and neighbourhood-oriented working.
From the care/social domain:
- Programmes aimed at family support, parenting support, guidance in the field of employment, income and housing and diversity and inclusion.
- Projects targeting parents who can play a major role in preventing their child(ren) from becoming radicalised.
- Parenting debates, with parenting support being combined with the learning of debating skills.
- A mentoring project, with susceptible individuals having access to a mentor who fulfils a protective role.
For education:
- A wide range of programmes or approaches aimed at strengthening young people's resilience and resistance.
- A serious game and teaching programme focused on online radicalisation and digital resilience of young people.
- The methodology that teaches young people how to successfully resist radical influences.
- Projects aimed at identity development which then reduce the cognitive openness to radicalisation.
Points to consider in this context are:
- The use of interventions and good practices that have already been evaluated, including those from other municipalities.
- Avoid too general, or too specific activities. In the case of activities that are too general, the intended target group is often reached less effectively, while activities that are too specific are often sensitive and can evoke resistance due to a sense of stigmatisation. Very specific groups are also often difficult to find and reach in this regard.
- Innovate and develop new interventions or projects and evaluate these activities afterwards (for example in the context of new forms of extremism).
- It is important to (continue to) evaluate the activity so that timely and accurate adjustments can be made where necessary.
Activities can also be undertaken for individuals who could potentially radicalise before they fall within the person-centred approach to radicalisation (PGA). This could, for example, take the form of interventions undertaken from a youth consultation group or a consultation group that focuses on a multitude of problems.