Objective and description
When the criteria listed in the PGA Act apply to an individual, the assessment team may decide to include that person in the person-centred approach (PGA). The municipality is responsible for supervising the PGA. Part of the PGA process involves a discussion of an individual in a multidisciplinary case consultation, during which the chain partners involved coordinate the shared insights and the specific approach.
Objective
The objective of the PGA is to combat radicalisation and prevent (violent) extremism and terrorism through the joint effort of local chain partners. A PGA is an integrated mix of administrative, criminal law, care and other interventions tailored to the person or their immediate environment. The PGA involves cooperation between organisations involved in governance (such as the municipality involved), criminal justice (such as police and the Public Prosecution Service (OM)) and healthcare (such as mental health partners).
Description
The PGA process to combat radicalisation consists of basically four phases: (1) reporting, (2) assessment, (3) case consultation and (4) monitoring and closing.
Process followed when signs of possible radicalisation are spotted
1. Reporting
In daily practice municipalities, police and the Public Prosecution Service receive indicators of (possible) radicalisation in a variety of ways. The usual way is through local partners in the social, care, education and/or security domains, sometimes from concerned members of the public such as friends and relatives, or from certain departments within municipalities.
Many municipalities have set up a ‘radicalisation hotline' or reporting structure to process the indicators received. These hotlines are not to be confused with other hotlines such as 'Crimestoppers NL' hotline operated by the National Police. The aim is not to investigate crimes but to provide help, coordinate information and follow-up actions, support professionals and combat radicalisation. If a radicalisation hotline does not already exist, a municipality must make arrangements to ensure that such indicators reach the right person and agencies.
2. Assessment
The organisation to which radicalisation indicators have been reported will submit the report to the municipality for it to be placed on the agenda of the assessment team which will then assess whether the person in question should be included in the PGA process. The assessment team consists of representatives of the relevant municipality (Public Order and Safety (OOV)) (the municipality in which the person resides, or last resided), the police and the Public Prosecution Service and determines which organisations are to be invited to participate in the case consultation (Article 3 of the PGA Act). These are only participants who actually fulfil a role and have an interest in the case in view of their respective duties and powers. Any municipality can convene an assessment team consultation to discuss a report of radicalisation.
The assessment is performed on the basis of objective criteria, including (1) the extent to which the person concerned is willing to use or propagate violence, (2) the extent to which the person concerned holds extremist views, (3) the person's social relationships, (4) the degree of identification with an extremist group or ideology, and (5) self-reliance (Article 5.3 of the PGA Act). In the context of the assessment, the three organisations referred to may consult other professionals such as interpretation experts. The assessment team also decides on whether a case should be closed (phase 4).
When the assessment team decides to initiate the PGA process, the municipality will notify the person concerned within a month, although exceptions are possible by which notification can be delayed (see Article 11 of the PGA Act). A local contact point, such as a participating government agency or body (Order in Council (AMvB), Article 4 of the PGA Act), is created in connection with the duty to inform and the exercising of rights under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). If a case is not included in the approach, the party that reported the signals of radicalisation may be informed.
1. Assessment team
2, Permanent case consultation participants
3. Occasional case consultation participants
3. Case Consultation
Once the assessment team has decided to include a person in the PGA, the municipality organises a case meeting with relevant partners (often through the Community Safety Partnership) during which the case is periodically discussed.
A person-centred, integrated approach like this is needed because no standard approach is possible with regard to people who become radicalised or have been radicalised. Science and practical experience have shown that no single profile exists of an 'extremist' or 'terrorist’ and that means careful consideration is required of the underlying causes of risky behaviour in each case. Based on the resulting insights, an assessment then has to be made of the most appropriate approach and interventions for each case. That is why it is called the person-centred approach in that it is tailor-made and requires close cooperation between different agencies and disciplines. Each organisation considers, either in consultation with the data protection officer or otherwise, which (special) personal data can be shared.
Action can be taken in all areas of life (housing, work, social network, etc.) and interventions can be both preventive and repressive in nature. Interventions might include a pathway towards work, probation supervision or the use of cease-and-desist conversations with the person of concern. An intervention matrix that provides insight into a wide range of possible interventions is currently being developed by the municipality of The Hague.
Methodical working and the Radicalisation and Extremism Case Consultation Working ModelThe Radicalisation and Extremism Case Consultation Working Model was developed for and by partners to support the case consultation and to enable systematic working with the aim being to treat individuals equally within the context of the approach. In each case, careful consideration needs to be given to the causes of risky behaviour and the necessary approach and interventions. A PGA requires close cooperation between, and commitment on the part of, agencies and disciplines, from security to specialist care. The Working Model helps with this collaboration and the content of the approach. A reference framework with objective criteria is used for each case to assess whether a person-centred, integrated approach to a person is necessary, which parties have a task or should be involved and by which parties relevant data should be processed. The Working Model can be requested from the National Extremism Support Centre (LSE) and a training course is available via the ROR. Goals of the Working Model
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Regular case consultation participants are:
- the municipality, the security department and the Community Safety Partnership;
- the Public Prosecution Service;
- the Police;
- the Child Protection Board (in the case of a minor/a person with children);
- the Dutch Probation Service (in case of person in/already out of detention);
Occasional case consultation participants (non-exhaustive) are:
- municipal services;
- the social domain;
- Social Support Act (Wmo);
- the education sector/school attendance officer;
- National Extremism Support Centre (including the National Immigration Intervention Team)
- the mental health (GGZ) and intellectual disability (VG) sectors;
- a theologian;
- a youth worker;
- a youth protection officer;
- Veilig Thuis (the domestic violence and child abused advice and reporting centre ‘Safe at Home’);
- the Police; core team, the Intelligence and Security Services Act Intelligence Department (Inlichtingendienst Wet op de Inlichtingen- en VeiligheidsdienstenService (Inlichtingendienst Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (ID-WIV)), the Threat Management Team;
- the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV);
- organisations within the immigration system (Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V));
- the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar);
A detailed description of the partners that may play a role in case consultation can be found here.
4. Monitoring and closing
The partners involved periodically assess the use and progress of the person-centred action plan. When doing so they also assess whether it is appropriate to close the case. In the absence of new indicators, the assessment team may decide to close the case, for example if the interventions used prove to be effective and further discussion is no longer necessary, or if the PGA turns out to be inadequate (and there are no more possibilities for intervention). The case consultation participants submit the proposal to monitor or close the case to the assessment team for a decision to be taken (phase B). If the assessment team agrees, access to the personal data will be terminated and, if necessary, the personal data itself will be anonymised. Numerous municipalities send the individual concerned a concluding letter explaining that the PGA has been terminated. A case can, of course, always be resubmitted (phase A).
Knowledge and skills
In addition to the required basic knowledge of radicalisation, the assessment team may decide to engage an expert (occasionally) in the case consultation. In the case of religious radicalisation, for example, a theologian can be consulted or, in the case of psychosocial problems, a mental health psychologist.
Finally, knowledge of the powers and legal frameworks is also essential.
Within the multidisciplinary case consultation
Case consultation involves skills to direct or contribute to an effective PGA. This includes a focus on how to identify radicalisation, how to assess, analyse and interpret, and how to work methodically.
Network
Besides the network used in the preventive approach, the organisations involved can build a network within the framework of the PGA. Doing so ensures that indicators are recognised and discussed faster and earlier, that mutual cooperation improves and that necessary interventions can be targeted more effectively.
In order to get the aforementioned knowledge to the right front-line professionals, it is essential that municipalities, as the parties responsible for supervising the local approach, build strong networks with relevant professionals in their area. In addition to the partners in the case consultation, these also include other professionals who can play a role in identifying radicalisation, so that they can recognise indicators and know how and where to share them. A broad network – consisting of organisations that do not face radicalisation on a daily basis – is helpful and may include front-line professionals, housing associations, bailiffs, (sports) clubs and large companies (such as distribution centres).
It is important to pay attention to data sharing.
Interventions
Various interventions are made within the framework of the PGA which are intended to strengthen protective factors and mitigate risk factors which are implemented by the social and care domain or partners from the security domain. Interventions in this phase usually focus on the following aspects of a radicalised person, as elaborated in the Radicalisation and Extremism Case Consultation Working Model.
Case consultation:
- Willingness to take action and willingness to use violence.
- Social network.
- Ideology.
- Identity formation.
- Self-reliance.
- Practical matters (housing, identity papers and finances).
It is very important that there is coordination between parties in the multidisciplinary case consultation regarding the interventions which are targeted at an individual so that interventions do not counteract each other, but actually complement each other instead.
Examples of preventive interventions/activities by the social and care domain
- Family and network support.
- Family counselling.
- Coaching from youth work.
- Theological/ideological guidance.
- Social-emotional skills.
- Practical support with housing, work or debts.
- Voluntary care in consultation with the person concerned (for example talks with a practitioner or admission to a mental health institution).
- Active intervention (this can include help with social problems, such as debts).
- Care authorisation, crisis measure.
- Registration with the Community Safety Partnership for the life-course strategy.
- Care measures through the Compulsory Mental Health Care Act (Wvggz).
- Coordinated approach in case of multiple problems via the bill addressing multiple problems in the social domain (Wams).
Examples of repressive interventions by the municipality or security domain
Security measures can be used within the various areas of law (administrative and criminal). This guide elaborates on the measures from criminal and administrative law which are specific for CTER (counterterrorism, extremism and radicalisation). With regard to the options which are not specific for CTER (e.g. a restraining order under Article 172A of the Municipalities Act (Gemeentewet)), we strongly recommend contacting the legal advisor at the municipality.
Administrative measures
The Ministry of Justice and Security can use various administrative measures to protect the Netherlands from terrorism and/or extremism which affect a case in the local PGA.
The coordination of these measures can be part of the discussion in the local case consultations. Municipalities can invite the NCTV's local advisor to the case consultation provide advice on the measures referred to below.
This temporary legislation provides a basis for the Minister of Justice and Security to impose administrative measures that protect national security. This can be done if a person can be linked to terrorist activities or to supporting them on the basis of his or her behaviour and it is necessary to protect national security. The possible freedom-restricting measures are: a reporting obligation, an area ban (possibly enforceable with electronic monitoring), a (physical) contact ban and an exit ban. The NCTV is authorised to impose these measures on behalf of the Minister of Justice and Security and bases its substantiation on information from relevant chain partners. In addition, the law allows all administrative bodies to refuse or revoke orders if there is a serious risk of them being used for terrorist activities. These may be decisions on subsidies, licences, dispensations or approvals.
Under Article 23 of the Passport Act, the Minister of Justice and Security can ask a mayor or Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to refuse a passport or declare a passport expired. This can be done if there is a well-founded suspicion that the person concerned will perform acts outside the Kingdom that threaten the security and other important interests of the Kingdom, or the security of powers friendly to the Kingdom. The mayor or Minister of Foreign Affairs makes the final decision to refuse a passport or declare a passport expired. When imposing such a measure, the NCTV consults with relevant chain partners and a request is always submitted for an alert in the information system used by the Dutch police and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. This measure makes it more difficult for people to leave the country and go to terrorist conflict zones and makes detection more likely if they return.
Image: © NCTV
Schematic representation of the process surrounding the withdrawal of Dutch citizenship
There are two grounds on which Dutch citizenship can be revoked that are related to terrorism, namely Article 14 paragraph 2 and Article 14 paragraph 4 of the Netherlands Nationality Act (RWN). Dutch citizenship can only be revoked in situations of multiple nationalities. Based on Article 14 paragraph 4 of the RWN, the Minister of Justice and Security has the power to revoke the citizenship of a Dutch citizen who has joined a terrorist organisation abroad. A separate decision declaring a person undesirable makes it impossible for the person concerned to travel legally to the Netherlands and makes illegal entry more difficult.
The second ground concerns Article 14 paragraph 2 of the RWN. This article allows the Minister of Justice and Security to revoke the Dutch citizenship of people who have been irrevocably convicted of a terrorist offence using an administrative mandatory measure because, by committing the offence, the person concerned has seriously harmed the essential interests of the Kingdom and has therefore 'terminated ' their connection with the Dutch Kingdom. This individual consideration is based on the point of departure that Dutch citizenship will be revoked unless there are special circumstances (such as no/very low sentence due to (severely) diminished responsibility or pressing humanitarian reasons). This revocation of citizenship is generally accompanied by a rigorous entry ban if the person concerned represents a present threat to national security, which then means that the person concerned must leave the Netherlands. This assessment is based on the assumption that this present threat to national security will last for a significant period of time following an irrevocable conviction for a terrorist offence. However, other factors are also important, such as current behaviour, the date and severity of the offence, the risk assessment, references, degree of punishment and the presence/absence of an ideological motive. The withdrawal of Dutch citizenship and the rigorous entry ban are two separate assessments that the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) bases on information available at the time. For them, the local case consultation is the main source of up-to-date information on those involved and they include this information in their recommendation.
Flowchart with text and representation of the process surrounding the withdrawal of Dutch citizenship
A party is guilty of financing terrorism when financial resources are used to provide direct or indirect support for terrorist activities (Article 421 of the Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht, WvSr). If there are indications of terrorism being financed at national level, these may be investigated by the Public Prosecution Service to see if there are sufficient grounds for a criminal investigation. Investigations can also be carried out by local government (for example within the framework of the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act (Wet bevordering integriteitsbeoordelingen door het openbaar bestuur, BIBOB) and the intelligence and security services.
On the grounds of United Nations Resolution 1373 a national freezing measure can be imposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice and Security, if there is a well-founded suspicion of terrorist activities or support for those activities. The measure can result in the freezing of the financial assets of the parties on the list. At the same time others are prohibited from making financial assets and resources which can be quantified in monetary terms available to these individuals or organisations. The freezing measure is an administrative measure which requires a tailor-made approach when it is imposed. It complements the EU’s terrorism list and UN’s extensive financial sanctions. A review of the national terrorism sanctions list is carried out every six months and can result in delisting. Delisting can also take place in consultation with the municipality as part of the person's social rehabilitation.
If there is a suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed, the type of offence will determine whether the police or the KMar investigate, under the direction of the Public Prosecution Service. The moment an employee of the municipality becomes aware of a possible criminal offence, the police and the Public Prosecution Service need to be contacted, with or without the intervention of the municipality's legal department.
A variety of terrorist offences are listed exhaustively in Article 83 of the Dutch Criminal Code. In a nutshell, terrorist offences are crimes committed with a terrorist intent. The term 'terrorist intent' is defined in the Dutch Criminal Code as the intent* to make the population or part of the population of a country seriously fearful, or to compel a government or international organisation unlawfully to do, not do, or tolerate something, or to seriously disrupt or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.
The Dutch Criminal Code also includes specific offences relating to preparing terrorist acts or supporting terrorism. Although they are linked to terrorism, these offences are not terrorist crimes according to the letter of the law. Crimes relating to preparing terrorist acts or supporting terrorism include financing and training for terrorism.
*Intent is also referred to as 'full intent', meaning that the goal of the perpetrator of the offence was to commit the offence.
Extremism is defined by the AIVD and NCTV, among others, as a willingness, for ideological reasons, to engage in non-violent and/or violent activities that undermine the democratic legal order. The Dutch Criminal Code does not include any crimes which relates specifically to extremism. Extremism per se is therefore not a criminal offence. However, non-violent or violent extremist activities, such as hate speech, intimidation or threats, can, of course, constitute criminal offences and can be reported to the police.
Whether an offence has been committed and is then prosecuted depends on the circumstances of the case. It is for the Public Prosecution Service to assess and determine that.