



The National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2022-2026

Preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism

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Contents

Introduction 6

Strategic principles 8

Development in threat 10

Strategy objectives 13



1. Procurement 14



2. Prevention 16



3. Preparation 19



4. Prosecution 21

Prerequisites for the approach 23

Finally 25

Management This document sets out a government-wide strategy that brings together all government parties in a joint approach to combat violent extremism and terrorism. The document is managed by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV).



The possibility of terrorist violence in the Netherlands will remain in the years ahead, with a threat being posed by both jihadism and right-wing terrorism. To protect national security and democratic rule of law, the Netherlands has adopted a sustainable, robust and flexible approach to terrorism. A wide range of partners - the intelligence and security services, police, investigation services, judicial system, municipalities, local professionals and many others - are all committed to preventing terrorist violence. The perpetrators of terrorist offences are investigated, prosecuted and punished and the social impact of violence is limited as much as possible.

The national counterterrorism strategy set out in this document describes the measures in place for 2022-2026. In general, this approach follows the existing course of counterterrorism. However, extra attention is necessary for the threat posed by potentially violent, extremist lone actors. Also, the growing role played by the online domain calls for innovative (technological) solutions to facilitate the detection and combating of the dissemination of violent extremist and terrorist content. Special attention will also be given to measures designed to ensure the safe reintegration of individuals after detention. The implementation of these safe reintegration measures will also start while individuals are still in detention. To be ready to respond to current and new threats, it is vital to continue to learn. With this in mind, the Netherlands will continue to draw on and develop its existing capacity and knowledge.

Introduction

The Netherlands has an open society in which individuals enjoy a great deal of freedom and relative prosperity. Citizens place great value on this way of life, which is only possible because of the country's democratic legal order, in which legislation is determined democratically and decides how issues are dealt with, based on democratic core values. Democratic legal order is not written in stone, because of which there is always scope for opposition and activism too. The government respects and protects this scope.

However, the same appreciation and respect is not evident among terrorists and violent extremists.¹ They do not want to use democratic means but instead resort to (threats of) violence to overthrow the democratic rule of law and replace it with a new order that is diametrically opposed to the way of life and the values cherished in the Netherlands. This ideology-driven violence manifests itself in all kinds of ways.

Reflection

A number of major attacks at the beginning of this century prompted the development of a coordinated approach to terrorism and violent extremism in the Netherlands. This has developed in various phases in the last 20 years: from pioneering to the development of expertise and specialist teams in the organisations in question. The strong infrastructure in place today is able to respond flexibly to changes in threat. The challenge now will be to maintain the current basis, strengthen it - where necessary - and maintain the quality achieved. Although a strong approach has been developed, learning and

innovation will continue, as also necessitated by new threats. For example, in the years ahead, special attention will be paid to the need for an online approach, individuals with a potential for violence and ensure the safe reintegration of individuals after detention. The implementation of safe reintegration measures will also start while individuals are still in detention. This will be explained in more detail later in this document.

Measures for 2022-2026

This national counterterrorism (CT) strategy outlines measures for the next four years. Our mission is to protect national security and the democratic legal order from the threat of terrorism and of forms of violent extremism that could lead to terrorism (hereinafter: terrorism and violent extremism). This definition of the term 'terrorism' has been chosen because the threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism is such that a strong approach is required, sometimes with the introduction of far-reaching powers and infringements of fundamental rights. The nature of the threat determines the approach, bearing the requirement of proportionality in mind. This does not mean that the threat posed by other forms of extremism are any less relevant or serious, just that a different approach is necessary because of the different nature of the threat. The aim of the measures used is to prevent terrorist attacks. All the parties involved contribute to the achievement of this aim by fighting extremist movements and individuals

¹ Terrorism is defined as 'ideologically inspired (preparations for) the perpetration of acts of violence against human life or of acts society-disrupting damage, with the aim of creating a climate of serious fear among (part of) the general population, bring about social change and/or influence political decision-making'. Extremism is the phenomenon involving people or groups who, ideologically inspired, are willing to commit serious legal violations or carry out other activities that undermine the democratic legal system.

who pursue terrorist violence. In order to limit the number of new supporters they are able to recruit and ensure that they are unable to disseminate their violent propaganda unimpeded and cannot gain any (international) experience. Naturally, every effort will always be made to achieve the timely identification of signs and prevent attacks and, if this is not possible for whatever reason, limit the impact achieved and deny terrorists the destabilisation they seek to bring about.

Implementation and accountability

The partners involved will further operationalise different parts of the CT strategy and do so in varying compositions. Each partner will always act within the limits of its own legal powers. The joint course adopted will be assessed on a regular basis and, if necessary, adjusted further to the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (*Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland (DTN)*). Different aspects of the approach will be evaluated on a regular basis. Integrated reporting on the progress achieved will take place after two years and then again after four years (the end of the period covered by this strategy).

Strategic context

The CT strategy falls under the overarching National Security Strategy (*Rijksbrede Veiligheidsstrategie*), which will be published at the end of 2022. It will replace the Integrated International Security Strategy (*Geïntegreerde Buitenland en Veiligheidsstrategie (GBVS)*) and the Dutch National Security Strategy (*Nationale Veiligheidsstrategie (NVS)*) and cover national security themes for the Kingdom as a whole.

This CT strategy ties in with measures designed to combat contiguous phenomena like non-violent extremism, problematic behaviour and social unrest. The strategy also interacts with the comprehensive prevention agenda of the justice and security domains.

Strategic principles

The following leading principles apply when combating terrorism and violent extremism:



Focus on terrorist threat

This CT strategy focuses on terrorism and violent extremism that pose a terrorist threat (hereinafter: terrorism and violent extremism), regardless of the ideological basis. The object is to prevent terrorist violence and also undermine violent extremist and terrorist movements by disrupting activities that incite others to engage in terrorist violence - for example, sedition, recruitment and training - and also to prosecute terrorist offences. Whether in the Netherlands or against Dutch interests abroad.



A comprehensive approach

This CT strategy describes the coherent use of targeted prevention, repression and recovery after terrorist violence has taken place (remedy). This comprehensive approach translates into the four main objectives for the CT approach: procurement, prevention, preparation and prosecution. From preventing people joining terrorist and violent extremist networks (targeted prevention) and preparations for terrorist violence and defence against this violence to the prosecution of perpetrators of terrorist offences (repression), recovery after terrorist attacks and the safe reintegration of individuals after detention (remedy). The implementation of these safe reintegration measures will also start while individuals are still in detention.



Sustainable and flexible

Terrorism is a permanent threat, because of which the counterterrorism approach adopted is based on a sustainable infrastructure with a wealth of existing expertise. The Netherlands is continuing to innovate and, where necessary, intensify its approach to enable it to tackle new and existing threats. A number of partners work together to this end: ranging from the intelligence and security services, the National Police and the Public Prosecution Service (*Openbaar Ministerie*) to the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (*Koninklijke Marechaussee*), the Custodial Institutions Agency (*Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen*), the Dutch Probation Service (*Reclassering Nederland*), the migration chain and, of course, local government and social partners. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV)*) facilitates policy-based cooperation and monitors the coherence of the approach.

Led by periodic analyses like the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands and reports by the General Intelligence and Security Service (*Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)*), the partners quickly raise changes to the course and problems with implementation for discussion and arrive at resolutions together. Prompt and reliable information-sharing within the legal frameworks is essential.



Legal basis and proportionality

The severity of terrorism demands the utmost of the means used to counter it. Ideally, these means will be preventive and deployed early enough to prevent violence. The restriction of constitutional freedoms is sometimes unavoidable but will only ever be introduced after very critical consideration. Measures must be threat-based and proportional and with a strong legal basis. The various parties involved in the CT approach will always act in accordance with the legal frameworks applicable to them.



Moral dilemmas

Professionals will unavoidably find themselves confronted with moral dilemmas in situations where core values conflict and general legal frameworks do not provide specific guidance. It is important that cooperation is organised such that the right parties are able to contribute a diversity of perspectives, that methods are in place for the competent discussion of these perspectives and also that the outcomes are always assessed against legal frameworks and ethical safeguards.



A methodical and innovative approach

The CT approach is now entering the quality assurance phase. This will involve the further implementation of a methodical approach, based on validated quality standards, which will be achieved via interventions by qualified professionals and on the basis of imitable, assessed procedures, amongst other things. This will make it possible to build on existing expertise and continue to develop as well. Innovation is crucial to the ability of the Netherlands to respond proactively to new threats and modus operandi: the online approach, for example.



An integrated approach in the Netherlands and abroad

It will only be possible to combat terrorism if intensive international cooperation is in place. To this end, security partners maintain close operational ties at an international level. The Netherlands is active diplomatically and sometimes also in a military capacity in the EU, UN, NATO and the Council of Europe and also plays an active role in multilateral fora like the Anti-ISIS Coalition and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum. Besides intensive bilateral relations, the Netherlands also invests in various strategic regions, to strengthen local capacity. Finally, it continually shares its experiences with other countries.



Communication

Terrorists use propaganda and disinformation to undermine democratic legal order and, by doing this, disrupt society. This makes communication an important part of the response to this situation. The communication used is transparent and easily verifiable and the perpetrators of terrorism are given as little attention as possible after an attack. The efforts of counterterrorism partners and of numerous social organisations that contribute to the resilience of Dutch society to terrorist threats are highlighted instead.

Development in threat

Jihadism continues to present the Netherlands with a major terrorist threat. From outside the Netherlands, a threat is posed by ISIS and Al Qaida, given their continued ambition to carry out and incite others to commit attacks in the West. The Dutch jihadist movement has weakened in recent years, partly due to repressive policy. However, vigilance is still necessary; the movement could quickly start to grow again if it were to have new, inspirational leaders or if issues were to arise that cause members of the movement to mobilise. Risks are posed by supporters of jihadism in the Netherlands, such as individuals who return from conflict zones or are released from detention. This is particularly the case where individuals have actually fought and are still showing a readiness to commit acts of violence.

Terrorist attacks by right-wing extremists have been committed or thwarted in a number of Western countries in recent years. A growing number of young people in the Netherlands (the estimate is several hundred) are not inclined to join known (offline) extremist networks but do support the accelerationist ideology.² In (international) online groups, terrorist violence is being glorified as a legitimate means to overthrow the current social system. Another threat of violence that is difficult to predict is posed by various ad hoc forms of extremism, often in combination with extreme anti-government sentiments and conspiracy thinking.

² Accelerationism is the right-wing extremist ideology that aims to create or accelerate chaos and, by doing this, bring about a race war and the replacement of democracy by a white ethnostate.

A context for far-reaching acts is created by the emergence of collective grievances, like those that arose when Covid 19 measures were introduced, for example. Specific events ('trigger events') can quickly escalate situations, at which time individuals may resort to terrorist violence.

Factors that influence threat

Geopolitical developments:

- The fluctuating capacity of ISIS and Al Qaida.
- A decrease in military pressure and increasing instability in the Middle East, Africa or Asia.
- New conflicts with a mobilising effect/pull factor.

Developments in the Netherlands:

- The hardening of society to themes like equal opportunities, climate, migration, Islam and racism.
- Online extremist communications that give rise to polarisation.
- Anti-government sentiments are accompanied by a far-reaching readiness to take action.

Developments in resistance:

- The effectiveness of repressive government policy and cooperation between domains.
- The ability of care and welfare partners to handle radicalised individuals who have psychosocial problems.

With all groups, it is difficult to predict who will actually take the next step and commit violence. This becomes even more difficult to predict when perpetrators act alone. Many recent jihadist and right-wing terrorist attacks in Europe have been committed by perpetrators who were acting alone, without belonging to a group or network. They act without involving anyone else and often without any preparations being observed. This makes it difficult to identify attack plans and adds to the unpredictability of the threat. One specific category of perpetrator who acts alone is the extremist, ideology-driven individual who also has psychological problems. This is the so-called 'potentially violent, extremist lone actor'.

The development of threat is covered in regular analyses, such as the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands and reports by the General Intelligence and Security Service.


Strategy objectives

The measures that form part of the CT strategy can be broken down into four main objectives (otherwise referred to as ‘areas of intervention’: procurement, prevention, preparation and prosecution).

This creates a conceptual framework in which areas of intervention are complementary and overlap in part. The pages ahead will describe the strategic approach to these objectives. This document then

concludes with an overview of the prerequisites for effective cooperation, high-quality knowledge and skills and systematic quality assurance.

Counterterrorism goals



1. Procurement



Information facilitates the performance of threat analyses and their interpretation. Given this fact, procurement also forms the basis for the threat-based approach adopted in all the other areas of intervention. Information is gathered from open and closed sources at a local, regional, national and international level and from various disciplines: intelligence agencies, investigative agencies, prosecution services and the armed forces.

The information gathered is primarily of an operational nature and relates to individuals, means or targets. It also pertains to the financing of terrorism and the travel movements of terrorism suspects identified (internationally). Furthermore, information procurement involves shedding light on phenomena, the assessment of social impact and the exchange of practices. All of the various partners face the constant challenge of identifying which information partners need and how to share it within the relevant legal frameworks in a timely manner.

Course for the coming years

Consolidation and optimisation

The detection of the travel movements of terrorists via various means, including migration flows and including asylum flows, is high on the agenda too. The improvement of cooperation (interoperability) between border and detection systems like the Schengen information system (SIS) and the continued

development of the use of the passenger information unit Nederland (Pi-NL) and the PNR instrument³ will improve possibilities to identify terrorist travel movements internationally. For example, the strengthening of data quality, matching with databases and the optimisation of use by chain partners. Intelligence and security services work together internationally in various contexts like the Counter Terrorism Group.

At a national level, cooperation between the security domain and other domains will be strengthened with a view to optimising the identification of individuals who pose a (potential) threat. This will also involve maintaining knowledge of phenomena and risk indicators and reporting any concerning signs. The challenge faced when procuring information is how to get the right information to the right place on time, paying careful attention to legal bases and proportionality.

Continued development and innovation

Increasing digitisation makes it vital for procurement to stay with the 'technological' times. Digital technology is becoming more and more vital to the successful identification of threats. This makes constant innovation essential. Another issue is how to assess the validity of information in a world where disinformation is spreading rapidly.

³ Passenger Name Record data is the data that airlines ask passengers to provide when booking flights. This data provides an insight into travel routes (reserved and previous travel routes), fellow passengers, luggage and contact and payment data.

PRIORITIES FOR 'PROCUREMENT'

- Consolidate the high-quality procurement, analysis and sharing of information about terrorist threats
- Optimise information identification and information sharing at a local, national and international level, paying careful attention to legal bases and proportionality
- Continue to develop innovative methods and tools in response to technological developments

2. Prevention

To prevent terrorism, measures will focus on preventing growth, disrupting threats and thwarting attacks:

a. *Preventing growth*

Targeted prevention through interventions on individuals or groups that are displaying concrete signs of radicalisation towards terrorism and violent extremism or on individuals that could be directly influenced by networks or individuals of this nature. The aim will be to prevent the growth of terrorism and violent extremism.

b. *Disrupting threats:*

Targeted prevention by weakening networks and disrupting propaganda, preparatory acts and other activities of groups and individuals that contribute to the terrorist threat. This involves interventions in networks that are prepared to use violence and also the targeting of disseminators and the dissemination channels used to disseminate terrorist and violent extremist propaganda.

c. *Thwarting attacks:*

Information must be converted into acts designed to ensure the timely identification of attack plans and warding off of terrorist violence as quickly as possible.

Course for the coming years

Consolidation and optimisation

Preventing growth

An individual-oriented approach (IOA), coordinated by local government, will be adopted to people who show worrying signs of radicalisation towards

terrorism and violent extremism. Local partners from domains including the social and care domains and national partners including the police, the Public Prosecution Service and the probation service will play an important role too. So-called case meetings are organised to jointly discuss the approach to be adopted to radicalising or radicalised individuals. The object of these meetings is to identify security risks and agree on the interventions to be used. The legal basis for these case meetings will be strengthened.

The successful extrication of individuals from extremist influences requires an understanding of the complex motivations of human behaviour, particularly in individuals with psychosocial problems and minors. In these situations, case meetings will focus on ideology, an alternative approach, the strengthening of self-reliance or the provision of psychological/psychiatric treatment. The National Support Centre for Extremism (*Landelijk Steunpunt Extremisme (LSE)*) will be responsible for advising parties on the above and, if possible, will treat the individuals in question as well.

It is crucial for this targeted prevention to tie in closely with the more comprehensive approach to the strengthening of the resilience and stability of the democratic legal order, for which the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and local government are responsible.

⁴ The legal basis will be strengthened via the legislative proposal on data processing as part of an individual-oriented approach to radicalisation and terrorist activities (*wetsvoorstel gegevensverwerking persoonsgerichte aanpak radicalisering en terroristische activiteiten*).

Capacity-building in fragile countries

The Netherlands has also committed itself to the elimination of root causes and the combating of violent extremism and terrorism at an international level, primarily in a UN, EU and NATO context. The Netherlands does this by continuing to seek cooperation in the region. One example of these efforts is a network of well-connected regional security coordinators who focus on gathering information and building prevention capacity.

Disrupting travel movements, cash flows and extremist speakers

The Netherlands will continue to actively contribute to European efforts to strengthen the investigation and border-control chains, primarily to and from conflict zones. The introduction of a number of new and updated European data systems for border control, such as ETIAS and EES, and the achievement of system interoperability will contribute to strengthened border control and security. Any new conflict zones with a pull on Dutch individuals will be monitored closely.

Under the European internal security strategy, liquid assets are monitored, as well as sources of terrorism financing like drugs and art. It is also important to disrupt and, where possible, put a stop to (foreign) speakers who incite violent extremism and terrorism in others, if they pose a threat to national security.

Placement on the national terrorism sanctions list, by doing which the financial assets of (potential) terrorists is achieved, will continue. Public and private parties will work together intensively⁵ to combat terrorism financing. One challenge is the increasing use of (anonymous) digital currency and (online) payment service providers instead of traditional cash flows to stay off the radar of authorities. The fifth European Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which was implemented in the Money Laundering and

Terrorist Financing (Prevention) Act (*Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme*) is useful here, as it requires the providers of custodian wallets and exchange services to do customer due diligence checks and monitor transactions.

Administrative measures and measures under immigration law

Another disruptive measure is an administrative intervention that limits freedom of movement if necessary to protect national security. This will be the case if the behaviour of individuals can be linked to terrorist activities or support for these activities. Interventions of this nature are permitted under the Temporary Administrative Measures for Counter-terrorism Act (*Tijdelijke wet bestuurlijke maatregelen terrorismebestrijding*). Measures that could be imposed include a travel ban, an area ban, a restraining order or a reporting obligation. This Temporary Act was extended by five years to 1 March 2027 on 1 March 2022. Measures under immigration law can also be used to deter individuals, withdraw Dutch citizenship, ensure proper monitoring and keep individuals available for departure from the Netherlands.

Disrupting threats and thwarting attacks

Information showing that preparations for terrorist violence are underway will be converted into action as soon as possible. The intelligence and security services will ensure this happens by working with the National Police, the Public Prosecution Service and the international partners concerned. If necessary, they will exchange information with other relevant parties, such as local government or private parties. Fast and reliable information-sharing at a local, national and international level is essential. In the Netherlands, special services like the Special Interventions Service (*Dienst Speciale Interventies (DSI)*) are on standby to intervene and make arrests.

Continued development and innovation

The development of a number of aspects of prevention will continue or shifts in emphasis will be made. This will apply for the measures used on potentially violent, extremist lone actors and the online approach.

⁵ Public parties work together closely in the FEC terrorist financing programme (Programma FEC-Terrorisrefinanciering), while public and private parties work together in the terrorism financing taskforce (Taskforce Terrorisrefinanciering).

Measures to be used on potentially violent, extremist lone actors

As indicated above when describing the threat development, potentially violent, extremist lone actors - a specific category of lone actors - have psychological problems in addition to their extremist drive. Cooperation between the security domain and the (psychiatric) care domain will be strengthened when dealing with potentially violent, extremist lone actors. One dilemma here is the field of tension between information-sharing and privacy. The care domain is bound by existing privacy frameworks and also by the resulting legal restrictions on the provision and sharing of medical and personal data in local care and safety houses. Further consideration will be given to which information-sharing is possible within the existing frameworks in view of the intended purpose of early detection and the need for an effective approach (care and security).

The online approach

The role that the internet and social media play in radicalisation and terrorist preparations cannot be stressed enough. A major challenge will be to tackle the disseminators of violent extremist and terrorist content and to disrupt dissemination channels. However, the following protection-related question applies here too: how to avoid people - young people in particular - coming into contact with and acting on terrorist and violent extremist online content?

The challenge will be to identify, detect and combat the dissemination of this content, particularly in the closed environments of alternative technological platforms. Another question here is how the disruption of dissemination channels affects freedom of expression and other fundamental rights. The course of action to be taken by the government and, as such, the tools to be used will depend on the severity of the communications. No distinction will be made between communications in the physical world and online content: acts that are punishable in the physical world will be punishable online too. The government has a clear course of action that it will

take to combat the dissemination of terrorist content. The challenge will be to make society resilient to content that cannot be defined as terrorist but does incite violent extremism and terrorism and, as such, has a damaging effect on democratic rule of law in the Netherlands. The government will explore the course of action to be taken in this respect in collaboration with the sector. No country is able to take on this challenge alone. The need to combat terrorist violent extremist content online is a prime example of something that requires international attention. The Netherlands plays a very active role in this respect - in the EU internet forum, for example. The same applies for efforts to combat the use of algorithms to strengthen the dissemination of this content. One priority will be to develop a course of action that makes it easier to combat the harmful effect of the algorithms used by internet companies.

PRIORITIES FOR 'PREVENTION'

Consolidation and optimisation of the following:

- Prevent growth via an individual-oriented approach
- Focus on prevention and capacity-building in fragile regions
- Detect and disrupt travel movements and cash flows
- Use disruptive administrative measures and measures under immigration law
- Act as quickly as possible and armed with as much information as possible in the event of an acute threat

Continued development and innovation of the following:

- Tackle potentially violent, extremist lone actors
- The online approach

3. Preparation



Even the very highest level of alertness and cooperation will not be able to rule out entirely the risk of incidents or attacks. There is no such thing as 100% security. With this in mind, all of the various partners have everything necessary to maximise preparations and defences against terrorist violence. There is also a need for decisiveness in times of crisis, fast and effective action by organisations like the Special Interventions Service to eliminate threats as quickly as possible (if possible), rapid detection and effective emergency assistance. The social disruption caused by attacks will be limited wherever possible: by defending individuals, property and vital processes and by limiting the impact of violence as much as possible. Maximum preparation will also call for alertness and resilience in response to new means of attack, both offline and online.

Course for the coming years

Consolidation and optimisation

Civil-aviation security

Civil aviation security will require special attention. This type of security is designed to protect against (bomb) attacks on aircraft and airports, hijackings, other forms of sabotage with possible fatal consequences and the use of aircraft as means for attacks.

In the future, security checks will be even more risk-driven and unpredictable. A configurable security system will make security more robust (ready for new threats) and flexible (possible to scale up quickly in the event of acute threats). The guiding principles will continue to be the proportionality of measures and consideration of the integrity of passengers.

The Netherlands wants to strengthen the security culture outside Europe too. This capacity-building will take place in cooperation with other governments, by supplying expertise to international working groups, taking part in audits and providing training, etc.

The aftermath of terrorism

After an attack, it is important keep social disruption (like unrest, reprisals and counteractions) to a minimum. This will require decisiveness in times of crisis, rapid emergency assistance and effective and de-escalating communication. This will be followed by good support, with social recovery in mind.

In a scaled-up national crisis structure, all the national and international parties involved will act jointly in all of the various phases of a crisis. To this end, they will continually train for and practise various scenarios (at a national and international level). Lessons learned from previous attacks in the Netherlands or abroad contribute to the knowledge and skill.

Defending targets and risk management

One of the objects of the 'surveillance and security system' is to prevent (terrorist) attacks on individuals, property and services. Specific risk estimates and a clear picture of responsibilities will pave the way for proportional and effective security measures. As such, the surveillance and security system is essential for maximum preparations for terrorist violence. In the years ahead, the system will be optimised further to make it even more resistant to future threats.⁶

⁶ Follow-up of recommendations of the independent advisory committee on a future-proof surveillance and security system (*Adviescommissie toekomstbestendig stelsel bewaken en beveiligen; the Bos Committee*).

Continued development and innovation

Development of (new) means of attack

Effective protection requires constant attention to developments in respect of means of attack. At one end of the spectrum, potentially violent, extremist lone actors often carry out attacks armed with simple means of attack. At the other end of the spectrum, there are terrorists who may decide to use new technologies too. For example, the 3D printing of weapons or the use of unmanned systems (drones). At the same time, these technological resources often also provide opportunities to counter the threat. Given these two sides of the same coin, it will be extremely important to continue to invest in knowledge and innovation, both in terms of combating attacks and improving resilience (in public spaces, for example). To this end, structural cooperation is in place with the TNO technological research institute, amongst other organisations.

Cyber threat

Developments in the cyber domain are happening rapidly. The possible use of the cyber domain by violent extremists and terrorists as a target or weapon calls for a constant assessment of the threat. The cyber threat is regularly charted in products of the General Intelligence and Security Service, the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands and the Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands (Cybersecurity Beeld Nederland (CSBN)).

PRIORITIES FOR 'PREPARATION'

Consolidation and optimisation of the following:

- The Surveillance and Security system pursuant to research by the Bos Committee
- More robust and flexible security for civil aviation
- Train and practise crisis management in order to mitigate the impact of terrorist violence

Continued development and innovation of the following:

- Alertness and resilience in response to new means of attack, both offline and online

4. Prosecution



The fourth and last pillar of the approach is to enforce national and international rule of law against terrorist offences. This extends to the attention necessary for the reintegration of individuals once they have left detention (remedy). The implementation of these safe reintegration measures will start while individuals are still in detention.

Investigation and prosecution

Terrorist offences are the most serious infringements of security and democratic legal order possible. This makes their investigation, prosecution and conviction a major priority for the National Police and the Public Prosecution Service. The aim is to investigate and prosecute individuals who are suspected of criminal offences (with terrorist intent), including their financing and preparation, in a timely manner and within the scope of legal frameworks. Individuals who are suspected, or have been convicted, of a terrorist offence are usually detained in one of the three terrorist units of the Custodial Institutions Agency (*Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen*). A detainee may also be placed in a terrorist unit if he/she engages in the dissemination of radical ideology while in detention.

The partners will enforce both Dutch and international rule of law, including the obligations that ensue from various UN resolutions. One major challenge is to gather evidence on offences committed abroad. The Netherlands contributes to this in various ways. For example, our country supports the bodies created by the United Nations to gather evidence about Syria and Iraq.

Besides acting as a deterrent, specific legislation also makes it possible to intervene early when preparations are being made for a terrorist offence.

Course for the coming years

Consolidation and optimisation

Knowledge-building in the criminal justice system

Legal means for prosecution will continue to be utilised as much as possible in the years ahead. The object is to increase the maximum sentence for participation in a terrorist organisation to 20 years. Added to this, in legislation will be clarified that the measures set out in the Long-Term Supervision Act (*Wet langdurig toezicht*) can be applied to individuals who have been convicted of terrorism. Attention will also be given to achieving effective action against terrorism and violent extremism in the online domain under criminal law. Specialist knowledge-building will arm the criminal justice team with the knowledge it needs to take on the terrorist challenges that the Netherlands faces.

Differentiation policy in detention

The terrorist units in the penal institutions continue their current differentiation policy: for example, separating leaders from followers in a group of individuals convicted or suspected of terrorism. The object of placement in a terrorist unit is to prevent the dissemination of extremist ideology in regular detention settings. Also, the object of differentiation policy (placement in one of the wards in a terrorist unit) is to prevent network development and undesirable influence. The terrorist units also offer

tailored disengagement and reintegration interventions.

Measures under immigration law

Where possible, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (*Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (IND)*) withdraws the Dutch citizenship or residence permits of individuals who have been irrevocably convicted of a terrorist offence or pose a threat to national security. Legislation does not permit this if it leads to statelessness. Individuals who have had their Dutch citizenship withdrawn will also have an entry ban or a declaration of undesirability imposed on them and are required to leave the Netherlands. The Repatriation and Departure Service (*Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek (DT&V)*) endeavours to ensure that individuals like this leave the Netherlands for their country of second nationality. If this is not possible because an individual and/or the country of origin is/are not cooperating, supervisory measures may be imposed under immigration law. The relevant organisations from the criminal justice and immigration systems seek to achieve the better monitoring of individuals like this who are not lawfully resident in the Netherlands.

Measures to ensure the safe reintegration of individuals after detention

In the years ahead, individuals who have been convicted of terrorism will regularly be released from detention. Their return to society will be accompanied by undeniable risks. To reduce these risks, the Custodial Institutions Agency works with the Dutch Probation Service and the municipalities to achieve controlled reintegration. Implementation of the safe reintegration working model (*werkmodel Veilige Re-integratie*) provides uniform language and frameworks for the promotion of cooperation.

Current policy on individuals who leave the Netherlands to fight with a terrorist organisation will be maintained. The following principles apply to individuals like this, who return to the Netherlands from terrorist conflict zones: avoid impunity,

prosecute criminal offences and ensure safe reintegration. Each returnee is subject to an individual-oriented approach. Opportunities and bottlenecks for reintegration and risks of intergenerational transfer are specified at the multidisciplinary IOA tables (*PGA-tafels*). Where it concerns minor returnees, the Child Care and Protection Board (*Raad voor de Kinderbescherming*) plays a coordinating role. A special team from the youth protection services acts as the guardian of minor returnees and guides the support provided while a child protection order is in place. A streamlined process will be realized in the youth protection system for the years ahead, with one coordinating certified institution as the point of contact. The IOA continues both during and after detention. Where possible, a detainee's family is involved too, to create the most stable context possible for reintegration and prevent further radical influencing (possibly on children too). The introduction of measures to ensure the safe reintegration of individuals after detention will be an important priority for the period ahead. The implementation of these safe reintegration measures also starts while individuals are still in detention.

PRIORITIES FOR 'PROSECUTION'

- Use legal means to investigate and prosecute suspects of terrorist offences and, by doing this, maintain national and international rule of law
- Prevent the recruitment and dissemination of extremist ideology during detention
- Where possible, withdraw Dutch citizenship from individuals who leave the Netherlands to fight with a terrorist organisation and individuals who are irrevocably convicted of a terrorist offence
- Introduce measures to ensure the safe reintegration of individuals after detention. The implementation of these safe reintegration

Prerequisites for the approach



Counterterrorism will only be effective if the right prerequisites are in place. For example, quality monitoring and capacity, knowledge and skill and a shared sense of urgency. Basic measures must be maintained too, regardless of the level of threat.

Quality monitoring and evaluation

When has a local identification structure been organised properly, an interpretation expert trained well or a reintegration programme successful? There is enough experience, but (validated) quality standards for methods and specialist professionalism are often absent. Questions like this are asked in many comparable countries.

With the pioneering phase now over, the time has come for the Netherlands to turn its attention to quality and quality assurance. Methods and interventions are being validated by academia and professional practice and more uniformity is being achieved in the methods used. For example, the Vera 2R risk assessment, which is being shared more and more⁷, and the safe reintegration working model.⁸ Quality standards will provide frameworks for a collective learning environment. The regular evaluation and impact assessment of various aspects of the measures applied will continue and the partners will work together on the improved assessment and assurance of quality.

Capacity and knowledge

To respond flexibly and decisively to a threat, CT partners will need to have sufficient capacity of the quality required. It is crucial for the chain as a whole that a solid foundation is maintained, regardless of temporary fluctuations in threat. This applies not only for the capacity to procure information, investigate and prosecute and the quality of all of these but also all other aspects of counterterrorism. The challenge for the years ahead will include responding to new phenomena in respect of knowledge, awareness and capabilities. One question to be answered is how to translate existing legislation and (local) capabilities into an online approach.

The ambition for the years ahead will be to adopt a more knowledge-driven approach. Besides 'practice based' - based on experiences in practice - a more 'evidence-based' approach will be taken on. This will result in both the monitoring of 'effective' elements and the more systematic monitoring of long-term effects. The State Training Institute for Counter-Radicalisation (Rijksopleidingsinstituut tegen Radicalisering) will offer training, while the National Support Centre for Extremism (Landelijk Steunpunt Extremisme) will provide tailor-made advice. Institutions like the police CTER knowledge centre (CTER-kenniscentrum), the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism and the Social Stability Expertise unit (*Expertise Unit Sociale Stabiliteit*) will contribute to professional development.

⁷ The VERA-2R is an evidence-based risk assessment tool that is used to assess the risk of violent extremism.

⁸ The safe reintegration working model is a cross-organisational model that has been designed to strengthen the individual-oriented approach.

Finally

Terrorism and violent extremism will continue to pose a threat to our national security, democratic rule of law and way of life in the years ahead. This strategy describes the strategic frameworks in place for measures in the next four years. Repressive measures, targeted prevention and remedy will all complement each other.

A solid infrastructure of legislation, powers and specialist teams and organisations has been established in the last 20 years. We have developed a strong approach but continue to learn, innovate and strengthen too, where necessary. Effective collaboration requires constant attention as well. This applies not just for the exchange of information but also, for example, the search for clear language and the bringing together of various different perspectives to identify the most effective and proportional measure for each situation.

The approach adopted reflects the threat. As such, special attention will be given in the years ahead to the role that the online domain plays in terrorism and violent extremism. This will require international commitment and technological innovation, within the legal frameworks applicable. Added to this, the bigger threat posed by potentially violent, extremist lone actors will require partners to review powers for information-sharing and cooperation in the approach adopted. The continuation and optimisation of measures to ensure the safe reintegration of individuals who return to the Netherlands from conflict zones and/or who have been convicted of terrorist offences, both during and after detention, will require special attention in the time ahead. This is all the more important because individuals who are convicted of

Special attention will be necessary for the following in the years ahead:

Disrupting the use of online channels

Online channels are playing an ever greater role in radicalisation and in preparations for violence. The use of the digital domain for the development of means of attack requires attention too.

Tackling potentially violent, extremist lone actors

Developments call for extra attention for new forms of threat and also for the risks posed by potentially violent, extremist lone actors.

Safe reintegration measures

The introduction of measures to ensure the safe reintegration of individuals after detention will be an important priority for the period ahead. Individuals who have been convicted of terrorism will regularly be released from detention in the years ahead. The implementation of these safe reintegration measures will start while individuals are still in detention.

terrorist offences will regularly be released from detention in the years ahead.

Finally: counterterrorism happens at the cutting edge. Extreme threats demand a strong response with a constant focus on proportionality. This is more than just a legal issue. When implementing measures, professionals regularly struggle with difficult decisions in practice: when to share which

information procured further to a care treatment and with whom? How to assess the risks posed by radicalising minors if international treaties and conventions prohibit the implication of children in a criminological context? How to help a person who has completed his/her sentence and is entitled to reintegrate into society, not knowing whether this person really no longer poses a threat?

Counterterrorism involves numerous complex moral dilemmas like this and also the constant need to achieve a balance between core values and interests. The courage and skill to work together to navigate between values, legislation, humanity and effectiveness are exactly what distinguishes democratic rule of law from the extremist and terrorist forces that threaten them.



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