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*When answering please state
the date and our reference.
Please raise only one issue in
your letter.*

Date 19 June 2009
Subject Tenth counterterrorism progress report

Last December your House received the ninth counterterrorism progress report¹. With this letter I offer you, also on behalf of the Minister of Justice, the tenth progress report. The report deals with the progress made in the last six months in the development and implementation of the various components of counterterrorism policy. This concerns, successively, the combating of radicalisation, international cooperation, creating decisive instruments and organisation, implementing security measures, being prepared for (the consequences of) a possible attack and providing information. As usual, the progress report starts with a summary of the most recent Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN). The DTN is drawn up four times per year by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) and falls under his responsibility. A list of action points has been enclosed with the progress report.

1. Summary Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands June 2009

The threat level with respect to the Netherlands remains, as in the previous reporting period, 'substantial'. This means that there is a realistic chance of an attack in the Netherlands or against Dutch interests. However, no specific indications of plans for an attack against the Netherlands and its interests have been identified in the past reporting period.

The international jihadist threat is still the most important component of the threat against the Netherlands and its interests. International jihadist groups consider the Netherlands and its interests as one of their 'preferred targets', as a result of its military involvement in Afghanistan and because of alleged insults to Islam in the Netherlands.

Terrorism

The international context of the jihadist threat

The main 'theatres' of jihad are still the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, North Africa, Yemen, Iraq and Somalia. In these regions, jihadist groups are active that support the international jihad and continuously pose a threat to western, and therefore Dutch, interests. Currently, the developments in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region are particularly relevant for the Netherlands' threat assessment. The poor security situation in Pakistan, which has been reported in the previous threat assessments, continues to be a cause for concern in this context. The Pakistani army has been involved in heavy fighting with Pakistani

¹ Lower House of Parliament, session year 2008-2009, 29 754, no. 140.

militants in the Swat Valley since the end of April 2009, in order to prevent these militants from spreading their influence in the country. It is currently not yet clear whether the military actions in the Swat Valley will lead to the long-term elimination of the militants. The operational effectiveness of core al Qaida is, however, put under pressure by the continuous attacks with unmanned aircrafts (so-called 'drones') in the tribal areas of Pakistan. These attacks have killed some prominent members of core al Qaida and have damaged the terrorist infrastructure.

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The increasing military action against the Pakistan Taleban can serve as a breeding ground for the recruitment of new members by all sorts of Islamist movements. Anger also grows because the attacks with unmanned aircrafts are allegedly performed in part from Pakistani territory. There are furthermore signs that the Pakistani Taleban intend to bundle their forces. This in answer to the increasing military action of the United States against al Qaida and the hard core of the Taleban in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Developments in Somalia and Iraq are particularly remarkable as regards the developments in other Islamic areas of conflict in the past reporting period. The Jihadist groups in Somalia are increasingly successful in enticing westerners, whether or not of Somali origin, to travel to Somalia and to participate there in violent Jihad. Violence in Iraq has flared up again in recent months. This puts increasing pressure on the relative improvement of the security situation in the country. The increase in violence shows that the security situation in Iraq remains fragile and that the underlying ethnic and religious conflicts are still current. Should the (intra)sectarian violence flare up further, this could lead to an increased inflow of jihadists and Iraq could once again form a more prominent source of inspiration for young Muslims who join international jihad.

The Internet has experienced a return of prominent international jihadist websites since the middle of April 2009. These websites are largely identical to the former prominent jihadist websites, which disappeared from the Internet prior to 11 September 2008.

Threats against Europe and its interests

In the past reporting period, travel movements from Germany to the jihadist areas of conflict in Pakistan have again been identified, which has further increased the number of jihadists from Germany present there. Furthermore, various European countries are faced with jihadists returning from conflict areas. A serious threat may be posed by persons trained in foreign jihadist camps and who are returning to Europe. After all, they can be controlled from abroad, they have indicated their jihadist intentions and have, moreover, acquired terrorist skills.

Moreover, jihadist groups can use the presence of jihadists from Europe in the jihadist areas of conflict for propaganda purposes. For example, Germany has again been confronted in the past reporting period with at least two video messages, in which radicalised speakers of German direct threats against the German public and speak out against, inter alia, the German military presence in Afghanistan.

Threats against the Netherlands and its interests

As stated above, international jihadist groups consider the Netherlands and its interests as one of their 'preferred targets', as a result of its military involvement in Afghanistan and because of alleged insults to Islam in the Netherlands.

However, no specific indications of plans for an attack against the Netherlands and its interests have been identified in the past reporting period. The likelihood of a jihadist attack on Dutch interests is currently highest abroad. This threat mainly manifests itself in regions where international jihadist organisations have ample opportunity to perpetrate attacks.

The fact that the Netherlands has caught the eye of the terrorists is evidenced by a video released by as-Sahab, one of the media organisations of al Qaida, on 12 April 2009. In this video, a jihadist speaks who makes a threat in German against *in particular* the Netherlands and Denmark, because these countries allegedly insulted the prophet Muhammad. The fact that jihadists are looking at the Netherlands, is further illustrated by other 'postings' on the Internet in which the Netherlands is mentioned or images are shown that can be related to the Netherlands.

During the past reporting period no travel movements of jihadists from the Netherlands to training camps have been identified. There are indications that in the past a very limited number of people travelled from the Netherlands to the Pakistan-Afghanistan region to participate in international, violent jihad, in order to undergo terrorist training there or for other purposes. There are so far no reasons to assume that (one of) these persons have since returned to the Netherlands. The presence of persons from the Netherlands in foreign jihadist training camps and areas of conflict makes potential strategic and tactical control of attacks in the Netherlands possible. The latter also applies to residents of other Schengen countries who, after having stayed in a training camp, return to Europe and would be ordered to carry out an attack in the Netherlands.

The international jihadist threat described above is again contrasted with the fact that the majority of the Dutch local jihadist networks are in a period of relative quiet or are directing their activities abroad.

Radicalisation and polarisation

The manifestation of salafism is increasingly the subject of (scientific) investigation in the Netherlands. These investigations are intended to provide insight into how Muslims, who are salafist-oriented, practice their religion. Noteworthy in this context is the investigation into the integration and social participation of visitors to the salafist centre of Ahmad Salam in Tilburg. This investigation, of which the results were published in March 2009, shows that most visitors to a greater or lesser extent hold orthodox views and adapt the strict way of living and thinking to their daily life. This calls up the image of differentiation in the salafist movement in the Netherlands, where there are a lot of believers, in addition to intolerant puritans, who adapt the teachings to their daily life in a western society.

Furthermore, the radical Islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) is trying to extend its influence in the Netherlands. It is remarkable in this respect that the Amsterdam Islamic student organisation Al Furqan provides a platform to HuT. For example, the HuT leader provided, on the invitation of Al Furqan, a lecture at the University of Amsterdam during the past reporting period. The fact that a

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student association provides a platform to the HuT means that the latter *potentially* has the opportunity to spread its polarising and activist message in Dutch higher education as well.

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Resilience

Since the start of 2006, the DTN has been providing an image of growing resilience against the radical and extremist views within the Dutch Muslim communities. This image has not changed during the past reporting period.

Finally, several persons have been arrested during the past reporting period in connection with the release of 2,500 minks on 15 March 2009. The arrests are the first results of intensified investigation and prosecution of animal rights extremists; part of the comprehensive approach as propagated by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice.

2. Combating radicalisation

2.1 Investigation

At the start of this year, a literature study was published that provides an overview of the empiric socio-scientific research into counterterrorism policy in various countries over the period from 1997 to 2007.² The author shows that the scientific investigation into counterterrorism is still in its infancy. Most research focuses on 'single cases'; only very few comparative studies are performed. Research into the effectiveness of CT measures seem to primarily focus on legislative aspect and other repressive and protective measures. The lack of studies into "soft" measures, such as political reform, integration and deradicalisation is remarkable. The outcome of this investigation will be taken into account as possible addition to the current research agenda for counterterrorism.

The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) co-finances, on an ad hoc basis, scientific research in the area of polarisation and radicalisation. In addition, BZK draws up a strategic research agenda, in consultation with the NCTb, WWI, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the G4, in the area of P&R. The knowledge gained from these investigations will be deployed in the analysis of radicalisation processes and in the implementation of policy on radicalisation within the context of the Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan.

2.2 Sources of radicalisation

For the last couple of years the so-called sources of radicalisation have been dealt with in order to limit the influence of these sources as much as possible. The approach consists of a coordinated deployment of existing powers and instruments of national and local government. The NCTb has a coordinating role in this process, the municipalities have a coordinating role at the local level. There is also cooperation in this field with the Ministries of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and Housing, Communities and Integration (WWI). The trend identified earlier of moderation steadied in the most recent analyses. The trend of increased resilience, identified in the ninth counterterrorism progress report, continues as well.

2.3 Combating the use of Internet for radical and terrorist purposes

Various processes are underway in order to combat radical statements and terrorist information on the Internet. Examples include monitoring, surveillance

² T. van Dongen, Not quite there yet: the state of the art in counterterrorism research, HCSS, 2009.

and the Cyber Crime Reporting Centre (MCC). In addition, a Notice-and-Take-Down-methodology (NTD) has been developed. The Security Risks of Internet Applications Working Party investigates which Internet applications can be deployed by terrorists and how this can be best dealt with.

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Investments made to block radical statements and other terrorist information have led to the development of a NTD methodology on the basis of a code of conduct. This code of conduct provides providers of (telecommunications) services on the Internet with their own accessible NTD procedure for reporting unlawful or punishable content on the Internet. From now on, Internet parties can always settle a report and ensure that unlawful and punishable content is removed from the Internet. The code of conduct has since been submitted to the Lower House of Parliament.

During the General Consultation with your House on the ninth counterterrorism progress report held on 2 April last, questions were asked about the relationship between the NTD code and the filtering and blocking of child pornography on the Internet and Member Gerkens' motion, in which the government is requested to ensure, as soon as possible, that the blocking of sites with sexual violence against children is provided with the possibility of a court review and an independent complaints scheme. Your House will be informed of this matter by letter before the summer recess. This letter will also deal with the progress of the inventory of the bottlenecks in legislation and regulations pertaining to the combating of cyber crime.

The Netherlands is closely involved in the international combat against the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Dutch efforts are aimed at formulating a joint approach to the combating of terrorist content on the Internet. For this purpose, the Netherlands takes part in the European Check the Web project, in which Member States exchange knowledge on and analyses of terrorist websites. Knowledge is currently exchanged, by means of a series of expert meetings, on the combating of Internet and terrorism in Great Britain, Germany, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. The Netherlands takes the initiative as regards the theme of self-regulation. In this context, the Netherlands continues to focus its efforts on more public-private partnerships and the promotion of measures, including and NTD methodology in an EU context.

3. International developments

In view of the nature and extent of the international terrorist threat, as set out in earlier and most recent DTNs, the further strengthening of bilateral programmes and the support of multilateral agencies remains important.

3.1 Bilateral cooperation

The threat posed by groups in North Africa remains a cause for concern. For this reason, the Netherlands cooperates with countries in this region in various subareas of counterterrorism. The dialogue and cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco in the field of counterterrorism have been further strengthened. In Morocco, there are currently various activities underway in this field. A bilateral project of the Royal Military Constabulary (Kmar) in the field of document forgery has just been completed. The Kmar arranged a training for representatives of the Moroccan authorities in the recognition and investigation of document forgery and made detection equipment available to them. In addition, a programme on terrorism and the Internet and the effectiveness of the Moroccan

opposing view spread via the Internet is currently underway. A Moroccan delegation recently visited several divisions of the National Police Services Agency (KLPD).

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During a visit to Algiers made by the NCTb on 28 and 29 October 2008, agreement was reached on the thematic content and time schedule for cooperation in the field of counterterrorism between the Netherlands and Algeria. The agreement concerned, inter alia, matters such as the combating of radicalisation, customs cooperation, the recognition and combating of document forgery, border control, port security and the combating of the financing of terrorism. Several concrete activities have since been initiated or in preparation, in particular in the area of the investigation and recognition of document forgery, port security and the combating of radicalisation.

3.2 European developments against terrorism and radicalisation

In the field of counterterrorism, the European Union (EU) serves as an important multilateral framework for the Netherlands as regards cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. The EU counterterrorism strategy with related action plan and the EU strategy to combat radicalisation and recruitment constitute the most important frameworks.

The government considers it important that the EU also adopts an active attitude in the field of counterterrorism in its external relations. The terrorism issue forms an important item on the agenda during the consultations of the EU with third countries and with other regional organisations. In the recent period, the EU troika, including inter alia Canada, the US, Egypt and the Russian Federation (RF) consulted on counterterrorism. The annual consultations between the EU and the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on the combating of the financing of terrorism took place on 4 and 5 May last in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia). The implementation of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the relevant recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) were discussed in particular.

There is also concrete cooperation between the EU, the Member States of the EU and several priority countries/areas. The attention of the EU focuses, inter alia, on the Western Sahel region. In June 2008, an EU mission to this region took place in order to chart the existing capacity in the relevant countries in the field of counterterrorism. Currently, discussions are ongoing within the EU concerning the most effective method to further shape the cooperative relationship with the countries in this region. Pursuant to the outcome of an EU mission to Pakistan in March 2009, consultations are ongoing between the EU Member States and Pakistan on technical cooperation.

Under the French presidency of the EU, the European Action Plan on Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment and the related Strategy were reviewed. Little has changed when compared with the previous version of the Action Plan. The most significant changes concern extra attention for the Media Communication Strategy and a less exclusive focus on Islamist extremism. France did everything within its power to tailor the action plan to the combating of radicalisation in other circles, such as: right wing extremism, animal rights extremism, left wing radicalism, or extremism of a nationalist nature. On the urging of the Netherlands, extra attention will be devoted to the investigation of processes of deradicalisation and, where possible, to possible government policy to accelerate these processes.

In 2008, the Counter Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) of the EU approached five Member States to take the initiative in the implementation of the action plan.

These were:

- Sweden - "Community policing";
- The United Kingdom - Media Communication Strategy and the development of a counter narrative;
- Germany - Internet;
- Spain - Imam training; and
- The Netherlands - Broad local approach.

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Denmark has since taken the initiative in the field of deradicalisation - in particular the deradicalisation of young persons. The Danish project is intended to develop practical instruments - such as coaching techniques - that can be deployed to detach these young persons from their environment and to deradicalise them. Another aim is to improve the contact between the law enforcement agencies and the municipalities. On the basis of the Polarisation and Radicalisation action plan of BZK, the Netherlands, in this context, organised, in cooperation with Germany and the United Kingdom, a conference on radicalisation in Berlin in the middle of February. Furthermore, an international city conference will be organised, within the context of the action plan, aimed at the exchange of knowledge and experiences with the local approach to radicalisation. The conference is intended for professionals involved at a local level with the combating of polarisation and radicalisation.

Finally, it should be reported that the EU, under Swedish presidency, will draw up a follow-up programme to The Hague Programme which was brought about in 2004 under Dutch presidency. The programme will be entitled the Stockholm Programme. The European Commission issued its Notice in respect of this programme in the middle of June, in which it explains what it considers should be included in this programme.

3.3 United Nations

A delegation led by Mike Smith, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) of the UN since November 2007, visited the Netherlands on 4 and 5 February last. The main focus concerned the monitoring of the implementation at the national and EU level of the counterterrorism legislation and regulations according the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 ('on criminalizing the financing of terrorists') and 1624 ('on incitement to commit acts of terrorism'). The main subject of the visit was the financing of terrorism. There was also attention for our counterterrorism policy in general, deradicalisation and technical assistance in respect of these themes. Smith was informed on Dutch practice pursuant to the obligations arising from UN Resolution 1373, such as the freezing consultations and the protocol which sets out the procedures for listing and delisting. In a meeting with the banking sector, a number of Dutch best practices were discussed, such as client acceptance (advance screening) and transaction blocks. In its first report, the CTED is positive about the Dutch procedures regarding the implementation of the UN resolutions.

During the tenth session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva (2 to 27 March 2009), the 'Human rights and combating of terrorism' resolution was adopted. Partly thanks to the efforts of the Netherlands and other EU Member States, this

resolution underlines the importance of legal protection when listing on and delisting from UN terrorism lists.

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Within the context of the implementation of the UN strategy, the Netherlands financed the working party that conducted a study into the manner in which the worldwide use of the Internet for terrorist purposes and radicalisation can be countered. The study provides an overview of Member States' best practices concerning the combating of the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes and radicalisation. The study concludes that technical solutions to reduce the use of the Internet for the aforementioned purposes are neither the only nor the most important contribution to the solution of the problem. Additional policy lines, such as the development of a substantive reply and international agreements on the (in)admissibility of certain content, are of great additional importance. The CTITF of the UN presented a follow-up to the study in project form. This project provides for a number of meetings in the content of the report and the policy recommendations are discussed, per component, with UN Member States. This should lead, inter alia, to more UN Member States developing their own policy, while making use of the experiences of others, in the field of the Internet in relation to counterterrorism and radicalisation. The aim is also to conclude better international agreements on cooperation during the implementation of the policy.

3.4 Terrorism lists in the EU and the UN

In the previous Progress Reports, you were informed of the improvements to the procedural legal safeguards for persons and organisations that have been placed on the EU and UN terrorism lists. It is important in this connection that UN Security Council resolution 1822, which was adopted in June 2008, already contains several limited improvements to the UN sanctions system, including in particular a regular review of the listings on the UN sanctions list.

January last, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (RAZEB) agreed to the adoption of the revised EU list of terrorist organisations, from which the Iranian MKO (Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation) has been removed. This delisting is a direct result of the ruling of the Court of First Instance of 4 December 2008. In a statement, the Council emphasised that if essential new information were to become available, the Council would assess whether relisting on the list would be possible.

As regards the UN terrorism list, the Netherlands searches, together with several like-minded countries, for possibilities to improve the legal protection of individuals and organisations that have been placed on this lists, especially where it concerns the procedures for 'delisting'. In doing so, the Netherlands focuses its efforts on creating an independent advisory panel that can advise the Security Council during decision-making.

4. Instruments and organisations

4.1 Security awareness

Increasing security awareness among various actors in society is an important theme. Security at (critical) companies and institutions is currently often placed with the responsible professionals. For example, agreements have been made with various divisions of the Counterterrorism Alert System (ATb) on the measures to be taken in the event of a terrorist threat, in order to increase the divisions' resilience. Personnel working within the secure areas of the Dutch airports are even required to follow security awareness training before they are

allowed to work at the airport. However, not every employee is always aware of the fact that he can also make an important contribution to the security at and around their own company. In addition to acting more aware in respect of various security aspects, employees can, often as the first one, identify deviant behaviour or an unusual situation in their own working environment. Employees can thus contribute to the investigation into terrorism and can additionally, with the aid of this awareness, also bring other matters to light, such as crime. The intention is to offer a helping hand to the various critical economic sectors (ATb sectors and CBRN institutions) in order to keep promoting vigilance among employees. It is important for the various economic sectors that actual knowledge and specific action perspectives concerning this theme can be incorporated into the sector's own training courses at their own discretion. After all, security awareness concerns long-term planning and structural attention for the subject.

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The NCTb is currently also developing a 'security awareness tool' for companies that are affiliated with the ATb and CBRN institutions. This 'tool' can be used to encourage companies and institutions to set up a security awareness programme in which their own employees:

- Become aware of their own unsafe behaviour;
- Learn to recognise deviant behaviour in others, and;
- Are offered action perspectives.

This security awareness tool is an attempt to increase resilience against a terrorist threat and other forms of crime.

4.2 Security of civil aviation

4.2.1 Passenger Name Records (PNR)

Under the Czech Republic's presidency the consultations on the proposal concerning the formation of an EU system for the exchange of Passenger Name Records (PNR) are continued. One of the aims of the proposal is the combating of terrorism.

Although the negotiations are progressing, there are still a number of points that continue to require discussion, such as:

- Scope and objective of the proposal;
- Data protection;
- Composition of the list with the data collected by the Passenger Information Units (PIUs);
- Procedure for requesting the data;
- Step-by-step approach with the ultimate goal of collecting all PNR data that fall under the framework decision;
- Powers and responsibilities of the PIU's, and;
- Formation of risk analyses.

Your House was informed of the most recent state of affairs during the General Consultation of 11 March last.

4.2.2 Body scanner

The nature of the terrorist threat directed against civil aviation has changed drastically in recent years. The search is therefore on for equipment that covers this new threat to the greatest extent possible. The body scanner is an example of such equipment and makes a significant security improvement possible. Body scanners are deployed in various locations at Schiphol by way of a

trial for security checks and customs checks. During the trial, passengers will have a choice between the regular check and the security scan.

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In 2008, the European Parliament adopted a motion in which the European Commission is requested to further elaborate a number of aspects concerning the use of body scanners, including privacy, before the deployment of body scanners during regular security checks at airports can be approved. The European Commission has instituted a working party that is busy further elaborating these aspects.

All conceivable security requirements have been built into the current trial with the body scanners at Schiphol in order to prevent identification - either intentional or unintentional. Images are not stored or saved, images are not related or linked to any other personal data and the body scan is physically and IT-technically separate from all other information processing systems. In addition, all necessary measures have been taken to prevent the faces of the persons from being visible on the screen and to prevent visual contact between the image analyst and the persons being checked.

4.3 CBRN terrorism

In view of the disproportionate consequences of an attack with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) means, a coordinated effort at the national level, aimed at the minimisation of the chance of CBRN terrorism, is necessary.

The process that has already been initiated, aimed at increasing resilience among high-risk CBRN research institutions - such as hospitals, laboratories and universities - is on track. The process will run from 2008 to 2013. Implementation at part of the objects has started. A start was made on strengthening the possibilities of (forensic) investigation in this area. In 2009, a specific CBRN awareness component will be included in the security awareness information activities, in addition to these measures, as described in this progress report. This component is intended for institutions that apply CBRN knowledge or agents.

The interdepartmental efforts aimed at strengthening of the security of biological agents will be continued. It is currently being assessed in what way a bio security regime can be structured. The Ministries of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV), Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) and Education, Culture and Science (OCW) are involved in this process.

In order to strengthen border control, work is being carried out in an innovative project on the structuring of a test CBRN-E detection street, which can optimise investigation of the flow of goods. The investigation of (home-made) explosives is also included. The test results will be available in 2010.

This year, the Netherlands acts as host country for the annual plenary GICNT meeting (June) and an international GICNT exercise (November). The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is an international, worldwide partnership aimed at combating and preventing nuclear terrorism.

Finally, we would like to report that the European Commission currently assigns

priority to CBRN security. In parallel partnerships that focus on the various substances (C, B and R/N), (policy) measures are currently being developed which will be published in 2009. The European Commission will anticipate this publication with the presentation of the CBRN Policy Package on 24 June 2009.

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4.4 *Home-made explosives*

The Dutch project entitled 'home-made explosives' was set up pursuant to the observation that the majority of all (attempted) attacks in Europe are perpetrated with explosives based on freely-available chemicals. The object of the project is to obstruct the manufacture and deployment of home-made explosives. The Dutch efforts to combat (home-made) explosives run parallel to the European Action Plan on explosives security, which was adopted by the European Council of Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs on 18 April 2008.

The Netherlands makes every effort to make any future European regulations as effective and proportional as possible. International expert meetings were organised in October 2008 and February 2009 for this purpose. In anticipation of a solution at the EU level, provisional measures were implemented at the national level. VROM and NCTb made specific (security) agreements for this purpose with the relevant public and private actors in respect of the most high-risk precursors. In addition, cooperation between the KLPD and the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service/Economic Investigation Service (FIOD-ECD) was realised, which means that companies and private citizens can submit reports on drug and terrorism-related precursors at one central reporting centre. This is the Transactions in Suspicious Chemicals Reporting Centre (+31 (0)40-2916000). A pilot will start in the second half of 2009. In addition, targeted information activities for specific target groups of companies will start shortly. Finally, the police are working on the problems identified concerning the police security system for explosives. A temporary solution supported by the experts and chain partners should become operational shortly.

4.5 *Study and knowledge migration*

Recent arrests in the United Kingdom in April of this year again emphasise the need to limit the security risks inherent in study and knowledge migration to the greatest degree possible. It turned out that 11 out of the 12 terrorism suspects that were arrested had entered the United Kingdom with a student visa.

Paragraph 7.3.1 of the "Towards a modern migration policy"³ blueprint, which was presented to your House by the State Secretary for Justice, already identified such security risks for the Netherlands. The NCTb cooperates with partners within and outside the central government to reduce these risks to the greatest extent possible.

For the purpose of a more trend-based insight into the in and outflow of study and knowledge migrants, OCW, NCTb, umbrella organisations of the knowledge institutions, and educational institutions charted the available information and provided it to the relevant parties. In the past year, the IND conducted an investigation into the drop-out rate of Pakistani students and performed extra checks of this target group. The IND also improves the insight into the drop-out rate of foreign students by drawing up periodical overview reports for the (governmental) parties involved.

³ 27 June 2008, Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 30 573, no. 10.

The IND, AIVD and NCTb investigate the possibilities of drawing up indicators for (possible) risks inherent in students and knowledge migrants, for the purpose of a more targeted screening of the risks to national security. Use may be made in this context of the experiences of other countries. It is also assessed, during the elaboration of the recognition methodology, whether more attention needs to be devoted to security aspects.

The NCTb and OCW, in cooperation with several educational institutions, are exploring the possibilities of developing information material for the purpose of creating awareness among the various contact officials (for example at knowledge and educational institutions) concerning signs that could indicate radicalisation or other risks to national security. This is in line, where possible, with the information activities regarding security awareness described elsewhere in this report. The NCTb and AIVD provided targeted information in various sessions with (representatives of) educational institutions.

4.6 Elaboration Pechtold motion

We informed you in the ninth progress report of the elaboration of the Pechtold motion concerning an investigation of Dutch terrorism policy. The report stated that the commission, chaired by *mr.* J.J.H. Suyver, started its activities on 1 October last. The commission has since, on 13 May last, submitted its report to the clients. Work is currently underway on the drafting of the Cabinet's response to the report. During the General Consultation with your House on 2 April last, we informed you that we will submit the commission's report and the Cabinet's response to you before the 2009 summer recess.

4.7 Act on the extension of the scope for investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes

On 1 February 2007, the Act on the extension of the scope for investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes entered into effect (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 580). The operation of the act is investigated with the aid of two instruments: monitoring and evaluation. The evaluation will be conducted five years after the entry into force of the Act. Furthermore, a monitoring investigation will be conducted annually which will be reported to both Houses of the States General. The first monitoring report and the response of the Cabinet was submitted to your House on 18 May last. The first monitoring report covers the period from February 2007 to February 2008. It concerns the first, provisional findings of the implementation of the relevant act. This first monitoring investigation focused on the implementation of the new regulations and their first implementation in practice. The second report will be presented to your House towards the end of 2009.

4.8 Foundations

During the General Consultation on the ninth counterterrorism progress report of 2 April last, your House was informed of the progress of the bill that regulates the disclosure requirement regarding the financial documents of foundations. This bill is intended to prevent fraud and abuse by legal persons, both from the perspective of financial-economic crime and from the perspective of the financing of terrorism. This proposed disclosure requirement better enables the government to implement continuous repressive supervision of foundations. In addition, the disclosure of financial documents also benefits donors and business partners. The

bill will be submitted this year by your House following advice from the Council of State.

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5. Security measures

5.1 Surveillance and protection

5.1.1 Afghanistan conference

The Surveillance and Protection Department (EBB) of the NCTb was closely involved in the organisation of the security of the Afghanistan conference held on 31 March 2009 in The Hague. Practically all delegations received protection during their presence in the Netherlands. Together with intelligence and security services and the police, the threat was assessed for all individual delegations that attended the conference and for event as a whole. The EBB recommended the necessary security measures on this basis. These measures were structured in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the municipality of The Hague, the Kmar, the Haaglanden Police Force and the KLPD. The structures that usually apply during such events were used to the fullest extent possible for the security of the event. To optimise cooperation, various scenarios and consultation structures were aligned with each other. The responsible organisations conducted coordination meetings on security every other day. This guaranteed optimal coherence of the internal, external and personal security measures. There were no security incidents during the conference.

5.1.2 Security elections for the European Parliament

The elections for the European Parliament took place in the Netherlands on 4 June 2009. In order to let the elections and prior campaign period progress safely and without disruption, the EBB paid extra attention to the security situation of the participating candidates. The approach is based on the experiences with the implementation of security during the Lower House elections in November 2006. It has turned out that practically all parties have designated a security contact person as a result of the previous elections. It can also be concluded that security awareness among the national political parties has increased. There were no security incidents during the elections.

5.1.3 Special Tribunal for Lebanon

On 1 March 2009, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was officially opened in Leidschendam-Voorburg. The tribunal is housed in the building that previously housed the AIVD. The threats and risks inherent in the housing of this tribunal in the Netherlands, are closely monitored by the NCTb in cooperation with the intelligence and security services and other information partners. The NCTb has since implemented security measures in respect of the tribunal.

5.1.4 Cross-border security of threatened persons in Europe

On 26 May 2008, the Minister of Justice informed your House by letter that he had proposed at the end of February 2008, at the occasion of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, to his colleagues to conclude agreements concerning the security of threatened persons that participate in the public debate, so that the careful transfer of the protection of those persons can be arranged in the event of travel to or residence in another Member State and if the need arises.⁴

EU agreements on persons with an official function for the state already existed. The proposal presented by the Netherlands in the second half of 2008 to the

⁴ Lower House of Parliament, session year 2007-2008, 23 490, no. 503.

Member States expands these agreements by including persons without an official position who receive personal protection from the government due to their contribution to the public debate and who travel to other Member States of the European Union. The proposal comprises an amendment of the resolution to institute a European network for the protection of prominent persons from 2002.⁵ If the amendment is adopted, the Member States will in future inform each other on visits by protected persons, with or without an official position. Information on security measures will also be provided during this process. Each Member State's own responsibility for policy on and the implementation of the protection of threatened persons remains an important starting point.

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Agreement was also reached at the start of 2009 at the official level. The European parliament has issued positive advice on the amendment of the resolution of 2002 as well. Finally, the Justice and Home Affairs Council of June agreed to this amendment.

5.2 Camera surveillance CTOV

The Camera Surveillance in Public Transport (CTOV) programme provides an impulse to camera surveillance for the purpose of the security of the public transportation sector which is vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

The programme is intended to increase social safety in public transport through the deployment of camera surveillance, inter alia for the purpose of preventing terrorist attacks and to accelerate investigations.

Central to the implementation is the cooperation between the relevant actors at the locations. Cameras are the means, increasing safety is the end. Citizens' sense of security is, for that matter, not one of the primary aims of the programme.

Approximately three million Euros per project are awarded for the seven locations.⁶ In addition, a national public transportation project has been awarded approximately four million Euros. Following a careful planning and preparation phase, the actual implementation of the camera systems started in May of this year, within this part of the subsidy programme.

GMI

In addition, the Joint Infrastructure Reporting Centre (GMI) is implemented at Schiphol Airport. This project was initiated by the Schiphol Security and Public Safety (BPVS) platform, in which all parties that are involved with security at Schiphol Airport are represented. The BPVS was instituted as a result of the conclusions of the Oort Commission that investigated the diamond robbery which took place in February 2005 at Schiphol Airport. Well over four million Euros in subsidies are available for the GMI. This project is approaching completion. The entire infrastructure is in place. As of April 2009, camera projects that relate to the following have been completed: registration number recognition, the placement of aircraft, the Dutch Railways train platforms, the transport and shipment streets, main square in front of the airport, crew centre, Plaza, the piers

⁵ 2002/956/2002, dated 28 November 2002.

⁶ It concerns the Amsterdam CS, Rotterdam CS, Utrecht CS, Eindhoven CS, Leiden CS, The Hague CS and The Hague HS train stations.

and gates, freight platforms, spotter areas, luggage collection areas and luggage basements. These locations were chosen on the basis of the management of the safety and security risks resulting from terrorism and crime. It is now important to ensure that these technical possibilities are used to the fullest extent possible.

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The effect of camera surveillance is compound in respect of both CTOV and the GMI. In general, it can be concluded that camera surveillance promotes in particular the efficiency of supervision in the prevention and enforcement phase. In short, it comes down to the fact that more can be done with the same personnel capacity, provided that the systems are provided with "intelligent" software and are properly geared towards each other and the needs and working method of the enforcement officials. In the event of a calamity, the "situational awareness" is increased substantially. This means that insight into the situation is increased and emergency assistance providers can act more effectively. In the repressive phase, camera images can contribute to the acceleration of the investigation process.

6. Responding to a crisis

6.1 Evaluation terror threat Amsterdam

The performance of the evaluation of the terror threat of 12 March 2009 in Amsterdam, as promised to your House, has been started. The central research question reads: How did the provision of information, cooperation, decision-making and communication take place at the time of and during the handling of the terror threat on 12 March 2009 and which lessons can be learned from this? As was promised to your House during the General Consultation of 2 April last, the evaluation will in any case devote attention to communication, aftercare and the local tripartite. The intention is to complete the evaluation before the summer recess of your House.

6.2 Counterterrorism Alert System (ATb)

The regional meetings within the context of the Counterterrorism Alert System (ATb) have been completed in the mean time. The main conclusions are:

- The meetings were well-attended, by all parties;
- The meetings clearly met a need;
- It has since become clear that the security region will become the point of contact in the near future for such meetings, and;
- A region round will be held at least once every two years in order to keep all parties involved actually committed.

Partly as a result of the region meetings and the report of the Netherlands Court of Audit, work is currently underway on the development of an instrument to determine to what extent the parties involved at the decentralised level have made further agreements within the context of the Alert System.

As stated in paragraph 5.1, work is currently underway on a security tool for companies affiliated with the Counterterrorism Alert System and for CBRN institutions.

6.3 Exercise

One of the pillars of the Counterterrorism Alert System is a solid exercise programme. The ATb exercise cycle consists of three components per affiliated sector. A general, introductory workshop will be organised first. A table top exercise will subsequently take place, in which the decision-making process is

practised. Finally, an operational exercise will take place in which the security procedures and the measures to be implemented are actually performed in practice. The first exercise cycle has since been completed for the Railways, Drinking Water, Airports, Nuclear, Natural Gas, Electricity, and Municipal and Regional Transport. In June 2009, a field exercise will be held in the Finance sector and towards the end of 2009 exercises will be conducted for the Seaports, Oil and Chemistry Industry sectors.

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6.4 Special Units system

On 14 July 2008, the report of the commission to evaluate the restructuring of the system of special units - also referred to as "the Dessens Commission" -, was sent to your House, together with a Cabinet response to the report. The system functioned "adequately" according to the commission. According to the commission, however, the system could still perform better in some areas. These points related primarily to the cooperation between the units within the system. In its report, the commission made several recommendations in that respect, which are currently being elaborated. It is expected that the implementation of all recommendations contained in the report will be completed before the summer of 2009. The following state of affairs is presented in respect of the main recommendations.

The Dessens Commission recommended to award the Special Interventions Service (DSI) the status of Arrest and Support Unit (AOE). On 11 February 2009, the AOE-KLPD was formed within the KLPD. This unit consists of DSI personnel, but is also an independent legal entity with its own duties, which is deployed on a different legal basis than that on which the actions of the DSI take place. This meets with the recommendation of the commission. The necessary agreements have been concluded at the implementation level, meaning that the AOE-KLP, in addition to mutual assistance to other AOE's, will, in principle, perform all AOE efforts of the National Crime Squad. It is expected that this will concern approximately 60 deployments on an annual basis.

The Dessens Commission furthermore recommended converting the system of special units into a "roof tile model", as it is referred to by the commission. This concerns a system in which the various units within the system structurally support each other and start learning from each other. A training course has since been developed to comply with this recommendation, which means that AOE personnel will be offered the possibility of being trained as "intervention specialists". The intention is to start this training in 2009. Each year, one or two training courses to become intervention specialists will be jointly organised by the DSI of the KLPD and the Marine Intervention Unit (UIM) of the Ministry of Defence. This allows for the rapid expansion of DSI capacity, should this prove necessary. Moreover, AOE and DSI personnel will be structurally offered the possibility to perform traineeships with each other. It will also be realised that the expertise available at the UIM can be deployed in a simpler manner in support of the other units within the system.

7. Communication and information

The mass media campaign 'the Netherlands against terrorism' will not be continued in 2009. The campaign was started in early 2006 at the request of your House and constitutes a response to the sharply increased concerns and need for information among the Dutch public. In the past three years, various target groups were reached within this broad campaign: the general public, but also

specific target groups such as local government, young persons, professionals who work with young persons and entrepreneurs in various private sectors. The mass media deployment of this campaign via Postbus 51 was stopped according to planning at the end of 2008. As of 2009, the communication efforts concerning counterterrorism will be mainly directed towards professional target groups. These arise mainly from the central policy themes. Increasing the awareness of actors in society across the board is an important theme in this context.

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The annual monitoring investigation into the risk perception and need for information of the Dutch public in relation to (counter)terrorism will again be conducted in the summer of 2009. It concerns the sixth edition of the investigation which has been implemented since 2004 in cooperation with the Government Information Service (RVD). The object of this annual investigation is to monitor public opinion concerning the subject of terrorism.

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

Dr. G. ter Horst