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When responding please stipulate the date and our reference. One issue per letter only.

In November 2007 the Lower House received the seventh progress report on counterterrorism<sup>1</sup>. With this letter please find enclosed the eighth progress report. The report outlines the progress that has been made in the past six months in the development and implementation of the various elements of the anti-terrorism policy. These elements, which will be presented in the following order, are: combating radicalisation, advancing international collaboration, creating effective tools and structures, taking security measures, being prepared for (the consequences of) a possible attack, and communication and information.

As usual the progress report starts with a summary of the most recent Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN). The DTN is formulated four times a year by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) and comes under its responsibility. A list of action points has been enclosed with the progress report.

### **1. Summary of the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands, May 2008**

The current threat picture is not materially different from the picture of DTN12. The conceivable international terrorist threat against Europe and therefore also the Netherlands clearly remains very present. This threat originates mainly from Pakistan/Afghanistan as well as North Africa and Iraq.

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<sup>1</sup> Lower House, session year 2006–2007, 29 754, no. 121.

Linked to the conceivable international threat is the high international profile of Europe, and within Europe, of the Netherlands. In the past period Europe has once again been on the receiving end of a lot of attention from international jihadist networks.

DTN12 indicated an increased profile for the Netherlands as a result of the prospective film by the PVV parliamentary party chairman about the Koran. Since its release the negative effects appear to have remained limited up to now, but the film and the associated publicity are becoming a sensitive topic in the Islamic world and have resulted in the fact that the Netherlands for also that reason is being featured on the radar of jihadists.

The fact that the threat level remains at 'Substantial' is mainly due to the aforementioned international threat and the international profile of the Netherlands.

## **Terrorism**

### *International threat*

In the past period Europe has once again been expressly in the spotlight of international jihadism. Events in Europe, such as the re-publication in Denmark of a Mohammed cartoon, the release of the 'Fitna' film and the Pope's baptism of a known Egyptian convert, are themes that receive international attention among radical Muslims. They use these events to illustrate their statements that Europe is engaged in an anti-Islam campaign. The latest video and audio messages from al Qa'ida leaders Bin Laden and al Zawahiri support this observation. Both clearly state that insults to Islam, and particularly to the prophet Mohammed, cannot go unpunished. They focus specifically on Europe for this point, and make reference to the Danish Mohammed cartoons. Separately from his public audio message, al Zawahiri also addressed Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) with a request for actions against Europe and specifically against Denmark. In a statement AQIM referred to a failed car bomb attack on the Danish embassy in Algiers.

During the past period, the international threat from the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan has still been present with regard to Europe. To a lesser extent this also applied to the threat from Iraq. The security situation in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area is deteriorating further and the new Pakistani government seems more prepared to negotiate with the local terrorist groups rather than actually combat them, as there is little support among the Army and the population for the hard line taken by the previous

Pakistani government. This may result in more freedom of movement for terrorist groups in the country who focus on areas outside Pakistan, such as Afghanistan and Europe. In the Netherlands, the known Pakistani/Afghan influence on the threat against Europe via the so-called Barcelona cell, with offshoots in various European countries, that was observed at the time of DTN12, has resulted in the arrest of a Pakistani in Breda. With the arrests in Europe the threat of this specific network has been eliminated. However, this case shows us that such manifestations of the international threat in Europe, and therefore also in the Netherlands, must be taken into account even more so than before.

Transnational networks continue to pose a potential risk for both the Netherlands and other countries, in the form of support for - or the desire to support - the international jihad. However, no new developments can be reported since DTN12 in this area.

#### *Profile of the Netherlands*

Actions and statements against Islam and the Koran generate a high profile, as was clear in the aforementioned recent messages from al Qa'ida leaders Bin Laden and al Zawahiri. At an international level the release of the film by the PVV parliamentary party chairman about the Koran received a lot of attention although, in contrast to Denmark with the re-publication of a Mohammed cartoon, the Netherlands is not specifically named in recent statements by al Qa'ida leaders. It is possible, however, that these statements date from (just) before the release of Fitna. Demonstrations against Fitna have taken place in a number of Islamic countries, usually of a peaceful nature. However, the protesters did repeatedly call for violence against the PVV parliamentary party chairman or against the Netherlands, and Dutch flags were burned. Only one Dutch consulate - in Indonesia - was actually confronted with violence. There is also information that points to a threat against Dutch embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, threats have been made on the Internet and during demonstrations against the PVV parliamentary party chairman and the Netherlands, and in different Islamic countries there have been calls for the boycotting of Dutch products. So far the announced boycotts of Dutch products have had little effect. It is notable that the calls for boycotts come mainly from the private domain. At the time of the first Danish cartoon crisis, Danish products were mostly boycotted in Islamic countries after calls from the government. In this case the response from officials in many Islamic countries has in fact been moderate. The international efforts by the Dutch government to explain the Dutch situation and distance itself from the Fitna film have so far borne fruit, as is also shown from the international reactions

to these efforts. The same applies to Dutch Muslim organisations, which have rectified the negative image of the Netherlands in Islamic countries as much as possible. However, many Islamic countries, including the 57 countries of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), have condemned the film and called on the Netherlands to take criminal prosecution against the PVV parliamentary party chairman and to ban the film.

Other reactions to the film consisted of hacking (defacing) of Dutch websites. The Taliban has also claimed responsibility for a number of attacks on Dutch military personnel in Afghanistan as a response to the film by the PVV parliamentary party chairman. In some cases the claims of motivation are clearly incorrect, but in some cases they are harder to verify. It may be that the Taliban Shura in Quetta (Pakistan) has ordered attacks aimed specifically at Dutch targets, but the roadside bomb strategy has already been used by the Taliban for some time, including against the Dutch military. Many of the claims, therefore, are propaganda. It is also notable that in some Islamic countries the Netherlands (Fitna film) and Denmark (Mohammed cartoons) are confused with each other. To many in the Islamic world the distinction between European countries is not as relevant: Europe as a whole is considered hostile to Islam.

Finally it must be noted that the international profile of the Netherlands may also be affected by the Fitna film in the longer term, especially when it comes to possible reactions: the plans for an attack in Denmark on one of the makers of the Mohammed cartoons first reported in DTN12 show, two years after the date, that the threat can last for a long time.

The developments within known local terrorist networks in the Netherlands do not result in an increased threat. So far the Fitna film has resulted in resignation within known local networks rather than an increase in the preparedness from this corner to use violence..

### **Radicalisation and Polarisation**

The spread of radical Islamic ideology increasingly takes place via the Internet chat service Paltalk. This service makes it possible to reach a large audience: young people can visit the chat room, where a youth preacher gives his lectures, from their own computer. This makes it possible for travelling youth preachers to not only service an audience in a particular location, but also in a much broader field. Another advantage of Paltalk in the eyes of Orthodox Muslims is the fact that Muslim women can also attend the lectures without having to be physically present in the same room as men.

Despite the initiatives against polarisation, some young Muslims generally feel less at home in the Netherlands. These young people are increasingly talking about a possible departure for more 'Muslim-friendly' countries in Europe, or a move to the motherland. Some of these young people have acted on their intentions. A study by the Institute for Multi-Cultural Development (FORUM) shows that 30% of young people of foreign heritage cannot envisage a future in the Netherlands. According to the Muslims and the Government Liaison Committee (*Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid, CMO*), dozens of young people of foreign heritage, often with a higher level of education, have already departed for other countries. Of course economic opportunities abroad may also play a role in this trend.

## **Resistance**

### *Social resistance*

Since the release of the *Fitna* film by the PVV parliamentary party chairman there have been no protest demonstrations or violence from Islamic circles in the Netherlands against this film. However, some Muslim organisations such as the Collaboration of Moroccans in the Netherlands (*Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkanen in Nederland*) and the Dutch Islamic Federation (*Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie, NIF*) which is associated with the Milli Görüs, have taken legal action against the film and the views of its author on Islam.

The commotion surrounding *Fitna* has given the Moroccan community an impulse to reinforce its traditionally weak organisational structure. The National Moroccan Consultation (*Landelijk Beraad Marokkanen, LBM*), which was established on 20 January, has played an important role in channelling the unrest about the film within the Moroccan community and has also called on the Muslim world not to boycott Dutch products.

Like mainstream Muslims, salafists have also shown a moderate response to *Fitna*. The statement of the Foundation of the Islamic Committee of Ahlu-Sunnah (Stichting *Islamitische Comité van Ahlu-sunnah*) dated 6 February 2008 is particularly noteworthy. The statement by this Foundation, with which the main Dutch political salafists are affiliated, claims that pronouncements by the PVV parliamentary party chairman generate 'fanaticism and hatred'. The statement also calls for defence of the Koran by peaceful means only. Even after the release of *Fitna* the responses to this film from salafist circles remained moderate.

Apart from the *Fitna* film the polemics between the Amsterdam Urban District Council Chairman, Marcouch, and a salafist imam, Jneid, show that parts of

the Moroccan community have, for the first time, taken a clear public stand against the polarising and anti-integration message of the salafists. The claim of the salafists that they represent the 'true' Islam is being expressly rejected.

The commotion surrounding the Fitna film appears to have resulted in overtures between Christian and Islamic organisations. Several organisations with a Christian foundation have strongly criticised standpoints of the PVV parliamentary party chairman with respect to Islam and, together with Muslim organisations, are taking initiatives to reduce the social tensions in the Netherlands and abroad. Remarkable in this context is a collaboration between the World Council of Churches (*Wereldraad van Kerken*) and the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (*Protestanse Kerk in Nederland, PKN*) on the one hand and the Muslims and the Government Liaison Committee (*Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid, CMO*) and the Islam Contact Group (*Contact Groep Islam, CGI*) on the other hand. In March 2008 these organisations conducted a 'reconciliation mission' to Muslim organisations in Egypt to neutralise any detrimental effects of the film.

DTN12 reported that in recent months the Dutch branch of the radical-islamic movement Hizb ut Tahrir (HuT) has focused mainly on mobilising Dutch Muslims against the (at that time proposed) film. Some days after the release of Fitna the HuT, on its website [expliciet.nl](http://expliciet.nl), called the film 'a farce': Koran verses have been used out of context and dialogue is avoided. At the end of the statement the HuT calls on Muslims to break their silence and defend their sanctums with all possible peaceful means.

The extreme-right, ultra-nationalist group Voorpost demonstrated in the Hague after the release of Fitna. The commotion surrounding Fitna has not resulted in an increase in the number of extreme-right incidents. A demonstration of the Dutch branch of Stop Islamisation of Europe (SIOE) was even cancelled for lack of interest. This Dutch branch of the SIOE has now disbanded.

#### *Countermeasures*

In the run-up to the release of the Fitna film, the Dutch government developed a number of national and international initiatives aimed at limiting the possible negative effects of the film as much as possible. The Dutch government established contact with key figures within the country and abroad, including governments and authorities, collaborations of Islamic countries such as the OIC and the Arab League and religious leaders in the Islamic world. An important role was reserved for Dutch embassies. The Dutch

government communicated that it attaches a lot of importance to the freedom of opinion, but that this freedom also brings responsibilities, such as respect for others. It was also made very clear that the film was not made by, and does not represent the opinion of, the Dutch government. After the release of the Fitna film the Dutch government distanced itself from the content of this film. The governments of Islamic countries as well as religious leaders in these countries appreciated the initiatives of the Dutch government and, in most cases, also actively assisted in further distributing the Dutch standpoint and explanation in their own countries. This has had the effect of toning down the reactions. How the perception of the Netherlands abroad will develop in the long-term as a result of the Fitna film is difficult to say at this point.

## **2. Combating radicalisation**

### *2.1 Three-pronged policy*

The previous progress report reported on the government memorandums that were sent to the Lower House<sup>2</sup> and the debates we have conducted in the Lower House with regard to radicalisation and the salafist dawa in particular. On these occasions the Government policy for dealing with the radical dawa was also explained. This policy is based on three approaches: increasing the resistance of the open society, confronting and de-legitimatising those who distribute the intolerant philosophies, and enforcement in the event of criminal offences, such as threatening with or using violence, and inciting to violence and hatred.

In the past period the focus has been on the further development of these policy intentions. The national government conducted meetings with experts in the area of the radical dawa in order to gather information to make it possible to concretise further activities. The consultation of experts is of material importance in order to ensure the effectiveness of activities. Research is also an important part of the national activities. In the past period research activities have been developed to get a better understanding of the salafist movement at local level. The knowledge that results from this research is used, among other purposes, in the implementation of the policy in respect of the radical dawa. Where necessary and upon request the local authorities are also provided with this information, as this is where the majority of the policy is actively implemented.

In addition - partly in the context of the Action Plan on Polarisation and Radicalisation - attention was given to the activities that are being developed

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<sup>2</sup> Lower House, 2007-2008, 29 754, no. 106 and 108.

and implemented at local level. At national level a start was made on working out supporting activities for municipalities. Soon a number of municipalities will be receiving financial support to implement projects in the context of polarisation and radicalisation. A European tender has been issued for the knowledge and advice centre for polarisation and radicalisation and the contract will be awarded before the summer. By that time, the Lower House will also receive an initial trend analysis on polarisation and radicalisation.

## 2.2 *European developments*

The EU Coordinator for Counterterrorism (CTC) fulfils a visible function in the international circuit. In March 2008 the CTC organised the first meeting for the national coordinators to discuss if and how bilateral and European coordination may be improved. A follow-up meeting will take place under the French EU presidency. The CTC is also attempting to achieve more synergy between the Action Plan on Radicalisation and Recruitment and relationships with third parties, for instance within the UN framework of the Alliance of Civilisations.

The Dutch approach to radicalisation is receiving interest from European member states but also, for instance, from the US and Australia. With the express purpose of learning from each others' approach, a lot of attention has therefore been given in this past period to exchanging expertise and experiences with other countries on the subject of combating radicalisation.

In July of this year the European Commission will publish an Announcement on violent radicalisation. Prior to this Announcement the member states, including the Netherlands, have been asked to contribute ideas and suggestions for an effective approach to dealing with this problem, among other things.

The trans-border character of terrorism also requires a broader international approach. The EU and the member states therefore work together with third countries in the context of external policy. The Netherlands fulfils a leading role in the collaboration with Morocco and Algeria.

## 2.3 *Combating the use of Internet for radical and terrorist purposes*

On 14 April 2008 the Lower House was informed about the current status of and possibilities for legal enforcement on the Internet<sup>3</sup>. This memorandum provides a general policy framework for the legal enforcement of cyber crime,

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<sup>3</sup> Lower House, session year 2007 - 2008, 28 684, no. 133.



whereby the legal framework for the combating of radical and terrorist communications receives specific attention, as does the effectiveness and proportionality of blocking measures.

A number of processes for the combating of radical communications and terrorist information on the Internet have been initiated, such as monitoring, surveillance, the cyber crime reporting point and the development of a Notice-and-Take-Down system. The monitoring project was terminated in December 2007. The project has proven relevant for the formulation of reports on current developments, long-term phenomenon studies and in-depth analyses. During the project experiences were exchanged and tasks were defined. Internet monitoring now takes place within the organisations involved on a structural basis, appropriate to the individual responsibility and tasks of each member.

The results of the Internet surveillance project are expected to be available in the summer of 2008. The objective is a structural continuation of surveillance by the police and further development of the reporting point, with an expansion of the cyber offences to be reported as the focal point.

The investments that have been made for the purpose of blocking radical communications and other terrorist information have resulted in the development of a Notice-and-Take-Down system, consisting of a Notice-and-Take-Down conduct line and a structural platform for the relevant public and private parties. The final advice on the method of implementing the NTD initiative is expected to be ready by the end of June 2008.

The Netherlands is closely involved in international efforts to combat the use of Internet for terrorist purposes. In an EU context this mainly concerns the recent proposal for the expansion of the Framework Decision on Terrorism, the 'Check the Web' project for the promotion of information exchange, and the format of the Cyber Crime Announcement of the European Commission. Within the Council of Europe the Netherlands is working on creating legal parameters for a proper approach to cyber crime. The Netherlands is also involved in the United Nations 'Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force'.

In these initiatives the Netherlands aims for the formulation of a joint approach to the combating of terrorist content on the Internet. Among other measures, this joint approach will involve public-private collaborations, for instance with a view to self-regulation, and the stimulation of other measures, including an NTD system in an EU context.

### **3. International developments**

#### *3.1 Bilateral collaboration*

In view of the nature and scope of the international threat, as outlined in DTN-12 and 13, the reinforcement of bilateral programmes and support of multilateral authorities are important. The steps already taken in this respect will therefore be given further shape.

In the context of the enhanced dialogue and collaboration between the Netherlands and Morocco with regard to counterterrorism, both the National Agency of Correctional Institutions (DJI) and the Royal Dutch Military Constabulary (KMar) visited Morocco, where they attended meetings on the subject of giving definition to the Dutch technical assistance in these efforts. The DJI is currently working out a 'twinning' for Morocco and the Netherlands to benefit the mutual exchange of knowledge between a number of prisons and detention centres, including an institution for juvenile offenders.

#### *3.2 United Nations*

In the UN context the finalisation of the Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Treaty remains a priority. The proposal, which was discussed in February 2008, is supported by a majority of UN members, but in addition to the US, a number of European member states also indicated that they could not agree with this proposal.

Preparations for the formal evaluation of the implementation of the *UN Global Strategy on Counter-Terrorism*, which will take place in New York in September 2008, are in full progress. The EU is particularly dedicated to safeguarding the agreement that has been reached and preventing other regional groups – such as the *Organisation of the Islamic Conference* (OIC) – from breaking open the strategy and wanting to re-negotiate the content. The Netherlands supports the CTITF – the UN-wide taskforce for counterterrorism – in the implementation of the strategy, both politically and financially. From a financial aspect this mainly concerns the subjects of 'Internet' and 'human rights' in the fight against terrorism.

#### *3.3 Terrorism lists in the European Union and the United Nations*

European legislation provides for the six-monthly review of the placement of persons and organisations on the EU terrorism list. In the context of this regular review the Council of the European Union has once again looked at the placement of the Hofstad group and its nine members on this list. Six of the Hofstad group members have now been released, and they currently do not constitute a demonstrable threat. The Netherlands has therefore requested

that these members be removed from the European terrorism list. On 29 April the European Council approved this request. This means that the assets of these six persons are no longer frozen. The remaining three members and the organisation itself remain on the list.

In the sixth<sup>4</sup> and seventh progress report you were informed of the improvements to the procedural legal safeguards of persons and organisations on the EU and UN terrorism list. These improvements, especially those at EU level as a result of the decision in the MKO case of December 2006, are already being implemented.

On 2 April of this year, the Netherlands participated in a meeting in Copenhagen with Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Germany, during which the possibilities for improving the UN system for individual sanctions were discussed. As a result of the meeting the Netherlands has joined this informal group of countries and, together with the others, is considering ways of further reinforcing the legal protection of the system. One of the possibilities that is being considered is a panel of independent experts who could issue non-binding advice about placement/removal to the UN sanctions committee.

The issue of enhancing the legal protection was also discussed with a delegation from the United Nations *Al-Q'aida and Taliban Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team*, which visited the Netherlands on 24 and 25 April. The Monitoring Team supervises the implementation of sanctions that result from the UN terrorism list<sup>5</sup>. The Team was pleasantly surprised by a number of best practices the delegation observed in the Netherlands. One of these was the way in which the Netherlands has, in the past, managed to succeed in bridging the time gap between the announcement of the placement of Dutch organisations on the UN terrorism list and the coming into effect of the resulting European listing by imposing a national freeze on the assets of these organisations. This was aimed at preventing the possibility, in this period, of balances being transferred to other persons or organisations before freezing measures at a European level could come into effect.

#### **4. Effective tools and structures**

##### *4.1 CBRN terrorism*

In view of the disproportionate effects that may be caused by a CBRN attack, a

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<sup>4</sup> Lower House, session year 2006-2007, 29 754, no. 100.

<sup>5</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1267.

coordinated effort at national level, aimed at minimising the chances of CBRN terrorism, is and remains essential. The process aimed at increasing CBRN security, which has already been started, has been given an extra boost by the fact that the government has made 96.8 million Euros available for the period 2008-2013. The vast majority of these funds will be used to increase the resistance of high-risk CBRN research institutes, such as hospitals, laboratories and universities. For the entire 2008 - 2013 period this amounts to 76 million Euros. The implementation of the measures in the first series of objects has been started. For this period 20.8 million is also available for enhancing the possibilities of (forensic) research in the area of CBRN. In this way, the investigation task is reinforced and a better response is possible in the event of an incident. A start has also been made on implementation with respect to reinforcing the response.

At the end of February 2008 the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Economic Affairs entered into an agreement with companies in the (petro) chemical industry with the highest risk factor; this covenant is aimed at the establishment of effective security measures. In addition, the Nuclear Energy Act is currently being amended under the direction of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, as a result of which licence holders will be obligated to implement security measures. These legislative changes are expected to come into effect in 2009. The reinforcement of the security of biological agents is also in progress on an interdepartmental basis. Meanwhile the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) has developed a code of conduct for bio-security by order of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, which is currently being implemented in the institutions involved and in relevant courses.

Finally we can report that the European Commission is currently completing an analysis of the responses of the member states to the Green Sheet on Bio Preparedness, and will submit this analysis to the member states in the first half of 2008. The core of the proposal is the fact that the Union, while pursuing its activities associated with a comprehensive approach to the increased security of explosives, detonators, precursors and associated technology, will continue to approach non-conventional risks with the same determination. This relates particularly to the risks of CBRN substances, including their possible use for terrorist purposes.

#### 4.2 *Explosives*

The Dutch project on homemade explosives was set up as a result of the

observation that the majority of all (attempted) attacks in Europe involve explosives made from chemicals that are freely available. The purpose of the project is to make it harder to fabricate and use homemade explosives. In theory there are countless chemicals that can be used to make explosives. A study by the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) has selected and prioritised the precursor chemicals, so creating a usable short list. TNO, in collaboration with the relevant sectors in the business world, is currently investigating where these substances can be found and what percentages and quantities are relevant with respect to taking measures. After this, agreements will be made on the now inventoried measures. This could include, for instance, the reporting of suspect transactions and restrictions on the sale of certain quantities and purities to consumers.

The Dutch method for dealing with (homemade) explosives is parallel to the European Action Plan for the Safety of Explosives that was approved by the European Council of Ministers on 18 April 2008. Recently, consultation with the Lower House has taken place on the draft action plan in the General Consultation in respect of the European terrorism policy of 10 April and 16 April this year, preceding the Council. The Action Plan provides for measures making the use of explosives and precursors by terrorists more difficult, and covers a number of security measures for commercial and homemade explosives. The Action Plan also provides for research, aimed among other areas at improving detection technology. The Netherlands actively contributes to the implementation of this Action Plan and prevents unnecessary burdens and obligations being imposed on the government, industry, commerce and retail.

France has indicated that, during its presidency, it will work on an explosives database and a European alerting system for the theft of explosive materials.

*4.3 Border crossing agreement between the Netherlands and the United States*  
On 19 May this year the Netherlands and the United States signed a *Joint Statement*, which enables the start of the pilot project '*International expedited traveller initiative*' (IET) between Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam and JFK in New York. This concerns the first Intercontinental Registered Traveller Programme. The objective of the IET, in the context of international civil aviation, is to offer travellers facilities for crossing the borders of the associated countries quickly, safely and reliably. The IET will only be available to Dutch and American citizens. They will only be offered the facilities after a comprehensive and thorough investigation has determined that the person is 'trusted'. One of the facilities which will be made available to the participants

is a (partially) automated border crossing. Another facility that will be offered is a quicker progression through the security checkpoints in the context of the security of civil aviation, the so-called *dedicated lanes*.

The IET initiative does not mean that new systems for automated (border) control are being developed, but rather that existing national programmes and facilities are being used. In the case of the Netherlands this is the PRIVIUM programme for automated border crossing, which was developed by Schiphol Airport in conjunction with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) and the Royal Dutch Military Constabulary between 1998-2001.

In April 2008 the United States started the 'Global Entry' programme, which gives a group of registered travellers the opportunity of crossing the American border through an automated system. The plan is that this programme will be used for the IET together with PRIVIUM. The pilot will last for one year and is expected to start at the end of 2008.

#### *4.4 Study and knowledge migration*

The Netherlands is increasingly profiling itself as a 'knowledge country'. Until now, however, little or no consideration has been given to aspects of radicalisation, counterterrorism and national security when admitting study and knowledge migrants to the Netherlands and during their subsequent stay. Recent developments, which have necessitated an increase in the threat level from limited to substantial, underline the need for taking appropriate measures. For this reason the NCTb is working together with partners (the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and the General Intelligence and Security Service, and the educational sector) on an approach that is to provide for improved collaboration and information exchange about this subject within and outside the national government.

#### *4.5 Elaboration of the Pechtold motion*

On 15 November 2007 the motion of Member of Parliament Pechtold was adopted by the Lower House<sup>6</sup>. This motion asks the government to consider the way in which a study into the Dutch anti-terrorism policy can best be given shape. The Lower House will receive a memorandum about the way the government plans to implement the motion.

#### *4.6 Monitoring of the Act on Broadening the Opportunities for the Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Crimes*

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<sup>6</sup> Lower House, session year 2007-2008, 31 200 VI, no. 79.

On 1 February 2007 the Act on Broadening the Opportunities for the Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Crimes came into effect. During the parliamentary debate the Minister of Justice promised to keep a process going in which current legislation is monitored on a continuous basis. This monitoring process has now been started and the results of this will be reflected in an annual report. The report on the first monitoring period - which runs from February 2007 to February 2008 - will be published in the autumn of 2008.

## **5. Security measures**

### *5.1 Findings of incidents in civil aviation*

As a result of the broadcast of the SBS 6 programme 'Undercover in the Netherlands' on 10 February 2008, the Minister of Justice, as indicated in the memorandum to the Lower House<sup>7</sup>, implemented additional measures at Schiphol Airport as quickly as possible. Effective from 12 February this year three passages at Schiphol were closed. Since 15 February there has been 100% physical inspection of personnel and carry-on goods, and in passages where biometric scanning is not yet in place airport passes are checked by two persons in order to prevent substitution. On 18 February these last two measures were also introduced in regional airports. The Royal Dutch Military Constabulary (KMar) has increased its supervision of these measures, which showed that the measures have been implemented. This was confirmed in the consultation of the Platform for Security and Public Safety at Schiphol of 3 April 2008. Starting on 1 July 2008, all vehicles that enter Schiphol airport will also be subjected to a security check.

Both KMar and Customs made personnel available to Schiphol Airport between 15 February and 14 March 2008 because of the increase in the security work. This work, which does not form part of the regular work of these services, consisted of providing assistance in searching personnel and conducting identity checks. KMar made 38 full-time personnel available, and Customs 35. In addition, KMar and Customs jointly intensified the existing random checks. Both services released 20 full-time personnel for this purpose. The effect of this intensification is a visible reinforcement of the supervision of employees who leave the platform by means of checks with a strong preventative character. At present it is being investigated how these checks may be conducted more effectively and efficiently. The changed inspection method, whereby information and observation are used, will be applied from the middle of April, which means the personnel deployment can be reduced.

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<sup>7</sup> Lower House, session year 2007-2008, 24 804, no. 46.

The deployment of the Customs personnel came at the expense of Customs supervision elsewhere in the Netherlands and has not had any consequences for the operational capacity at Schiphol airport. The Dutch Royal Military Constabulary also made capacity available from its own organisational units to provide assistance in the identity checks and searches. The deployment relating to the increase in the random checks originates from the Schiphol police service.

The Civil Aviation Safety Inspectorate conducted an investigation into the functioning of supervision in the period prior to the incident. In its report the Inspectorate concluded that the supervision of the security of civil aviation by the Dutch Royal Military Constabulary in 2006 and 2007 was sufficient with respect to pass inspections and access control of personnel and carry-on items. In a quantitative sense KMar virtually met its supervision obligations. In a qualitative sense there should have been more attention for the documentation and verifiability with respect to internal processes and the supervision results. A new supervision method now provides improvements on a number of aspects. The Inspectorate made a number of recommendations which are being adopted.

As a result of the debate of 13 February this year the Minister of Justice has investigated the opportunities for criminal penalisation with respect to unauthorised access to protected sections of airports. To realise this a legislative proposal which, among others, makes changes to the Aviation Act, has now been submitted to the Lower House<sup>8</sup>.

It is currently being evaluated whether it is advisable to promote a similar penalisation with respect to unauthorised access to other essential parts of the infrastructure in the Netherlands.

## *5.2 Security of civil aviation*

At Schiphol security scanners are still being used on a trial basis in a number of locations, both for security checks and for Customs checks. During the trial persons go through the security scan on a voluntary basis. Passengers are given a choice between the regular check and the security scan. The trial results indicate that the security scanners show a qualitative improvement compared to the current regular security.

As reported in the seventh progress report, new equipment is being tested at

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<sup>8</sup> Lower House, session year 2007-2008, 31 386, no. 2.



Schiphol to improve the check for liquids in hand luggage. The test forms part of the activities in the context of a collaboration between Germany, England, France and the Netherlands, which is working on a 'Road map for liquids'. This graduated plan, which has been coordinated with the European Commission, aims to have technology with which liquid explosives can be detected available as soon as possible, so that the current liquid inspection methods can be dispensed with. Although manufacturers make test versions of new and improved security equipment available at a rapid rate, it is currently not possible to say when usable equipment will be available. Expectations are that this will not be in the immediate future.

### 5.3 *Monitoring and security*

The Lower House was informed by means of a memorandum from the Minister of Justice dated 17 September of the intention of improving quality and collaboration between the police forces and the Royal Dutch Military Constabulary with respect to the monitoring and security task within the monitoring and security system<sup>9</sup>. In this context the Surveillance and Protection Department (EBB) of the NCTb has now taken a number of steps in collaboration with the police forces of the "Big Four" cities and with the Royal Dutch Military Constabulary.

For instance, a leaflet has been formulated with the objective of optimising the collaboration through the use of unequivocal terminology. In addition there are plans to review and, where necessary, develop joint training courses in the context of the monitoring and security system. Closer collaboration has also been defined and implemented in a number of priority areas, such as a bi-annual joint exercise in the area of monitoring and security between the Royal Dutch Military Constabulary and one regional police force, the conducting of periodical consultations, the setting up of a national monitor centre and the establishment of a monitoring and security department that can act as a central point of contact of the Royal Dutch Military Constabulary in this area.

The NCTb is involved in the arrival in the Netherlands of the Lebanon tribunal. Comprehensive discussions have been held with the United Nations in recent months about the necessary security for the tribunal and its members. The threats and risks associated with the establishment of this tribunal in the Netherlands are closely monitored by the NCTb in collaboration with the security services and other information partners. The Lower House was informed accordingly by means of a memorandum from the

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<sup>9</sup> Lower House, session year 2006-2007, 30 557, no. 10.

Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 21 September 2007<sup>10</sup>.

On 28 March 2008 the appointment decision of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations with respect to the Central Alarm Centre (RAC) was published in the Bulletin of Acts and Degrees<sup>11</sup>. Within the monitoring and security system certain persons and objects are connected to the RAC. The RAC receives observation information about, among others, robbery, fire and burglary alarms and immediately forwards them to the local police organisation for follow-up.

## **6. Responding to a crisis**

### *6.1 Counterterrorism Alert System (Atb)*

Together, the NCTb and the essential business sectors in the Netherlands have developed a broadly functioning warning system for terrorist threats, the Counterterrorism Alert System (ATb). Recently the Netherlands Court of Audit completed its investigation into the Counterterrorism Alert System. Following on from the discussion of the draft findings report with the NCTb in February, the final report is currently being formulated. It is expected that the final report will be submitted to the Minister of Justice in June of this year.

### *6.2 Practice*

One of the pillars of the Counterterrorism Alert System (ATb) is a thorough practice programme. The ATb practice cycle consists - for each associated sector - of a workshop, a 'tabletop' exercise where the decision-making procedures are practiced, and an operational exercise in which measures are implemented in practice.

After the previously conducted operational exercises with the Rail, Drinking Water and Airport sectors, a number of operational (partial) exercises were organised for the Nuclear sector in the period from November 2007 to March 2008. The results of these exercises are currently the subject of evaluation. In April 2008 a 'tabletop' exercise was organised for the Sea Ports, Oil and Chemical sectors. In 2008 operational exercises for the Gas & Electricity and the Financial sectors are on the programme.

### *6.3 Special Interventions Service (DSI)*

In January 2008 the Evaluation Commission (Dessens Commission) started on the evaluation of the system of special units and the Special Interventions Service. The evaluation was the result of the agreements made in the system

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<sup>10</sup> Lower House, session year 2007-2008, 31 128, no. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Bulletin of Acts and Decrees, 28 March 2008, no. 61, p. 21.

review in 2006. The Dessens Commission set to work in a very energetic manner, and has now submitted its final report to the NCTb. The Government standpoint will be submitted to the Lower House before the summer recess.

## **7. Communication and information**

### *7.1 Public campaign*

In February 2006 the NCTb started on the long-term mass media public campaign entitled 'The Netherlands against terrorism', at the request of the Lower House. The campaign contributes to the efforts to increase citizens' knowledge about terrorism and counterterrorism and to strengthen public confidence in what the government is doing with respect to counterterrorism, and indicates what citizens themselves can contribute. The focal point in all campaign periods are the professionals who - each in their own way - make a contribution to counterterrorism in the Netherlands.

The last two mass media campaign periods - November/December 2007 and March/April 2008 - specifically highlighted the work of three groups of professionals who may be confronted with the theme of radicalisation among young people. The campaign followed two 'trails': exactly *what* the youth workers, community police officers and teachers are doing is presented through television spots, radio spots and (print) advertisements. In addition, material has been developed and made available to help teachers in facilitating class discussions about the theme of radicalisation; namely teaching packages and the dilemma game [www.zestienmiljoenrechters.nl](http://www.zestienmiljoenrechters.nl).

During the spring campaign in 2007 the number of people who could not name a single measure for preventing a terrorist attack in their neighbourhood dropped from 31% to 24% and, in the autumn, remained stable around 25%. After the autumn campaign in 2007, two-thirds of the general public was familiar with the 'preventing radicalisation' measure. This is not an increase when compared to the situation before the campaign. However, after the campaign 'Preventing radicalisation' did increase compared to other measures, to the second place in the list of the most-often named measures. Best-known is 'Monitoring suspect persons and groups'. After the campaign, measures for preventing terrorism were recognised more than repressive measures.

During the spring campaign of 2007 half of the general public felt that the government does enough to prevent a terrorist attack, but during the summer period this dropped to around four out of ten people. During the 2007 autumn campaign, however, this increased again slightly to around half of all people.

This year is the third and last year of the mass media public campaign. In the third quarter of 2008 the campaign will once again focus on the target group of companies. In the last quarter a concluding campaign period will follow in which the campaign website will be given extra publicity. This will make it possible for the website to be maintained after 2008, for communications with the previously targeted groups: the general public, young people, local administrations, professionals who work with young people and the various business sectors.

The Minister of Justice,

The Minister of the Interior and  
Kingdom Relations

Dr. E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin  
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Dr. G. ter Horst