

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism

To the President of the House of Representatives of the States General
Postbus 20018
2500 EA Den Haag

Unit Policy and Strategy Department
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Annexe 1
Re Sixth Progress Report on Counterterrorism

In December 2006, the House received the Fifth Progress Report on Counterterrorism.¹ This letter represents the sixth report. In it, we describe the progress made since the beginning of the year in developing and implementing the various strands of counterterrorism policy: international cooperation, the fight against radicalisation, the creation of an effective organisation and instruments, security measures, and preparedness for possible attacks and their aftermath. The report begins, as usual, with a summary of the most recent National Terrorist Threat Assessment (DTN). The threat assessment is updated four times a year by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), who is responsible for its content. Appended to this report is a list of action points.

1. A summary of the National Terrorist Threat Assessment, May 2007

Threat level

The threat level for the Netherlands is currently *limited*. This means that the likelihood of a terrorist attack is relatively slight, although it cannot be ruled out. The NCTb has reached this conclusion by carefully weighing the national and international dimensions of the terrorist threat against the level of resistance to it. Various trends exist that could entail a threat to the Netherlands and the rest of Europe, but there is currently no evidence that such a threat has materialised or is likely to do so in the near future.

Below, we describe the factors underlying this threat assessment.

¹ House of Representatives, 2006-2007 session, 29 754, no. 94-{}-

Terrorism

National

The specific threat has stabilised at the level stated in the previous threat assessment. This means that the threat posed by networks and/or individuals is still slight. But it does not preclude the possibility – as previous threat assessments have pointed out – that networks may quickly become more effective by acquiring new leaders or experienced new members. There are no current indications that this is taking place.

The likelihood that chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons will be used in an attack is, as in 2006, slight but real. The most likely scenario is a small-scale chemical or biological attack against an individual or a small group of persons within an enclosed space. We assume that in the long term the threat of an attack involving radioactive material will grow. Globally, there were fewer CBRN incidents in 2006. This year has seen a number of CBRN incidents worldwide, such as the use of chlorine in attacks in Iraq.

International

Countries taking part in the conflict in Afghanistan still have a high international profile, as evidenced by various video threats and the continued kidnapping of Europeans (including Germans) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several jihadist networks are working to step up the pressure on Western countries with troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. To some extent, this makes the Netherlands a potential target, particularly given the similarities between its profile and Germany's. It is also still true that controversial comments about Islam in Dutch public and political discourse occasionally draw attention to the Netherlands.

North Africans play a significant role in jihadist theatres of operation such as Iraq, Chechnya and Afghanistan. As previous threat assessments have pointed out, there is a danger that trained and battle-hardened jihadists will return to North Africa. Given their contacts with and proximity to Europe, this could affect the threat throughout the continent, including in the Netherlands. At present, however, there is no evidence that this is actually taking place. The existence of North African networks with a growing international profile increases the likelihood that North African immigrants living in Europe will become more susceptible to recruitment for the international jihad. During the latest reporting period, jihadist activities have been on the rise in North Africa itself. Algeria has turned into a centre for jihadist terrorism, and Morocco has also witnessed an increase in jihadist activities.

The previous threat assessment predicted a further drop in the already low number of European jihadists volunteering to fight in Iraq, largely because the war there is increasingly becoming a conflict between Iraqis and volunteers from neighbouring countries. But contrary to expectations, volunteers are still being recruited in Europe. During the latest reporting period, networks recruiting for the jihad in Iraq were closed down in Belgium, France, and Spain. These groups would appear to have no links with the Netherlands. During that same period, however, the Dutch authorities did arrest a person belonging to a network recruiting for Iraq. There are no indications that large numbers of European volunteers are travelling to Iraq, but the downward trend noted earlier seems to have stopped. This makes it seem likely that trained or experienced jihadists are returning to Europe. But there are no more indications that this is taking place than during previous reporting periods.

In August 2006, members of a jihadist network were arrested in the UK and charged with planning attacks against civilian aircraft. This network was also planning major attacks on British oil and gas plants and possibly on the British internet infrastructure. Their intention was not to inflict a large number of casualties but to cause major economic damage and social disruption. Owing to the specific nature of this British network, it is unlikely that Dutch-based networks will choose similar targets. But it is important to take this type of threat into account, because local networks communicate with each other.

The internet

The internet continues to grow in significance as a tool for jihadist communications. This is evident, for instance, from the terrorist who blew himself up with a bomb belt in an internet café in Casablanca. As far as is known, he had gone there to pick up instructions. Jihadists go online to inform each other about ways of using internet applications to prepare and carry out terrorist attacks. In Iraq, for instance, Google Earth has been used to plan attacks.

Radicalisation

Many Muslim groups in the Netherlands are showing a certain resignation in the debate about Islam. On the internet, some young Muslims seem subdued, responding much less vehemently to inflammatory comments than in the past. It is currently unclear to what extent this growing resignation is affecting the scale of radicalisation in the Netherlands. It may be a

sign that Muslims are becoming more resistant to extremism. But on the other hand, it could mean that Muslims are turning away from Dutch society.

There are no indications that the international jihadist message is finding sympathy in the Somali, Iraqi, Afghan, or Chechen communities in the Netherlands. These communities are attached to their mother country not by jihadism, but by humanitarian concern for the safety of family and friends.

By contrast, tension between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Middle East *is* being felt in the Netherlands. Since the beginning of this year, some Salafist (Sunni) mosques in this country have been preaching intolerance. Sunnis have also been posting negative comments about Shi'ites on Dutch-language web forums. Any further escalation of the conflict between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq and any growth in Salafist agitation could harm interdenominational and interethnic harmony among Muslim communities in the Netherlands. Anti-Shi'ite agitation in the Netherlands has not yet resulted in any incidents.

Polarisation, extremism, and intolerance

Salafist preachers and writers are becoming more critical of Muslims in the Netherlands whose behaviour contravenes Salafist doctrine. Some have even gone so far as to denounce certain Dutch politicians and opinion makers with an Islamic background as heretics. This trend may make Muslims more wary of repercussions from their own faith community if they step out of line.

It is still important to monitor extreme rightwing activities and statements. Public demonstrations by extreme rightwing groups show their growing confidence and increase existing social polarisation. It should be noted that confrontations during these demonstrations tend to be provoked by anti-fascist counter-demonstrators.

Resistance

Social resistance

Previous progress reports have described differing views on the four main Salafist mosques in the Netherlands. The first view, which is espoused by the government, is that they disseminate an ideology that could eventually undermine the democratic legal order. The second view is that promoting an orthodox doctrine is not the same as espousing radicalism.

The appearance of the prominent Tilburg Salafist imam Ahmed Salam in the TV programme *Pauw & Witteman* (in late March 2007) highlighted these differing views. The second view will be strengthened if mosques adopt media policies aimed at improving their image, thereby weakening society's sense of urgency about the danger of Salafism.

Countermeasures

On 27 April 2007, the Council of State approved a decision by the then Minister for Immigration and Integration to declare an Eindhoven imam an undesirable alien. This may deter other such preachers from making anti-Western or anti-integration comments in public.

2. International developments

European cooperation

Previous progress reports mentioned the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment and the EU Action Plan on Terrorism, which include a media communications strategy aimed at combating radicalisation by propagating the EU's values and objectives abroad. The House was informed of the media communications strategy during preparations for the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 19 and 20 April 2007.²

An important objective of the EU Action Plan on Terrorism is to tackle the use of the internet for radical and terrorist purposes. In the past six months, the EU member states have made progress in exchanging information obtained by investigating and analysing internet data. In addition, the European Commission has held talks to discuss the legislative scope for combating the misuse of the internet. The Netherlands has pointed out that this will require practical cooperation.

The Council of the European Union is also considering new legislation in this area. On 12 December 2006, the Court of First Instance passed judgment in a case against the Council brought by the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MKO). The Court concluded that the procedures for drawing up the EU list of persons and organisations with connections to terrorism do not provide for effective legal protection, adequate justification, or the right of defence (*audi alteram partem*). The Council has long been aware that these procedures need strengthening in order to ensure legal protection. To this end, the Council has been

² House of Representatives, 2006-2007 session, 23 490, BP and no. 449

working to improve its performance in justifying the inclusion of entities on the EU list and informing those affected when they are either placed on it (listed) or removed from it (delisted). The Council has also been working to make it easier for listed individuals and organisations to object. They will be informed of the incriminating evidence that has led to their listing, which will make it easier for them to defend themselves. In addition, the Council has been working to improve the procedure for reviewing the EU list every six months. The Court did not order the MKO's removal from the list, but it did order the Council to remedy the shortcomings noted. In January and March 2007, the Senate was informed by letter of how the Council would fulfil this obligation.³

On 1 March 2007, the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries, resigned. The Netherlands wants to maintain the position of special coordinator and hopes that this vacancy will be filled as soon as possible. Combating terrorism is a transfrontier activity and thus requires a Europe-wide approach. The EU Counterterrorism Coordinator plays a major role in coordinating the implementation of counterterrorism measures at the same time as drawing attention to the importance of counterterrorism in the EU's external relations.

Over the past six months, the EU has frequently reminded third countries of the importance of a joint approach to international terrorism. It has done so with frontline countries like Algeria, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Indonesia and in discussions with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, the EU is providing technical assistance to Algeria, Morocco and Indonesia, with the emphasis on exchanging information and expertise. Furthermore, the EU is helping the United Nations carry out its Global Counterterrorism Strategy, adopted last year, by working with third countries to build capacity.

United Nations

UN Deputy Secretary-General Bob Orr, who heads the Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), has started implementing the UN Counterterrorism Strategy. He has asked a number of countries, including the Netherlands, to assist with various aspects of the strategy, not only by offering political support but also by providing or financing expertise and helping other UN member states carry out various aspects of the strategy (such as building

³ Senate, 2006-2007 session, 28 764, F and G

capacity and enforcing compliance with terrorism conventions). The Netherlands will focus on protecting human rights in counterterrorism and preventing radicalisation and recruitment.

On 19 December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1730, which establishes a new procedure for removing persons or organisations from the '1267 list' (a list of persons and organisations associated with Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden or the Taliban). In future, listed persons will be able to submit a request for delisting to a focal point to be established at the UN Secretariat. The focal point will decide whether the request contains any new information. If not, it will reject the request. If a request does contain new information, the focal point will forward it to the country that proposed the person's listing, the person's country of residence, and the country of which the person is a national. These countries will assess the request, after which the focal point will present it to the UN Sanctions Committee. Finally, the UN Secretariat will communicate the Sanctions Committee's decision to the listed person. In addition, when a person or organisation is added to the list, the focal point will have to provide a notification and explanation to the UN permanent mission of the country of which the person is a national or resident. This communication will have to include a clarification of how the person listed will be affected, how he or she can submit an objection, and how he or she can later submit a request to be delisted. The focal point will ask the authorities in the country concerned to forward this information to the person or organisation in question. This will mean that persons and organisations wishing to be delisted will no longer have to depend solely on mediation from their own government.

On 22 December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1735, which reiterated the importance of the UN list and introduced further improvements to the procedures. The resolution makes it obligatory to use a special form for giving reasons for nominations for new entries on the list. The form allows the country proposing a listing to provide the necessary information, give reasons for the proposal, and supply the information to be communicated in a notification to the person or organisation to be listed. This will make it easier for the person or organisation listed to defend themselves.

3. Combating polarisation and radicalisation

The Dutch Government continues to pursue its broad-based approach to counterterrorism. The importance of this approach is evident from the summary of the threat assessment. The Government aims to isolate, confine, and curb radicalisation – and to widen its approach to include combating polarisation. The House will soon be receiving an Action Plan on

Polarisation and Radicalisation (2007-2011), containing the Government's intentions. The plan includes current initiatives to combat radicalisation, a decision that will bring consistency to Government policy. In implementing the plan, the Government will seek a balance between preventive and repressive measures. It will set out its intentions and priorities in detail in an annual operational plan.

In order to intervene early in the radicalisation process, the Government is examining how best to help municipalities deal with incipient radicalisation and itinerant preachers. These objectives fall under the strategy for dealing with radicalisation. The Government will provide municipalities with instruments that are easy to apply. It is important to ensure that these instruments are tailored to the local situation.

The Government is urging local authorities that have so far not had to contend with radicalisation to think about how they can eliminate its roots. To assist them, several manuals and booklets were developed last year. This year, the internet site www.nederlandtegenterrorisme.nl will devote more attention to the role of local government in counterterrorism. As is taking place in the market sector, local authorities will be made aware of how they can help combat terrorism and radicalisation.

Dealing with hotbeds of radicalism

We have previously informed the House that counterterrorism services are applying the 'hotbed approach' to various breeding grounds of radicalisation in the Netherlands. A hotbed is an organisation, often in the voluntary sector, that fosters radicalisation processes. The goal of the authorities is to curb these processes. For this purpose, national and local authorities are coordinating existing powers and instruments. For operational reasons, we cannot currently make any public statement about the organisations designated as hotbeds and the measures to combat them, either current or future.

The multidisciplinary analyses of these hotbeds have now been updated. They suggest that the counterterrorism services should maintain the hotbed approach and continue to take measures.

Approach to use of the internet for radical and terrorist purposes

Our strategy for combating the use of the internet for radical and terrorist purposes aims to keep track of the problem and develop methods for blocking or obstructing access to undesirable content. This strategy requires international cooperation.

The study entitled 'Jihadists and the internet', which was submitted to the House late last year⁴ describes some worrying developments. We consider it essential to maintain existing measures for combating online radicalisation and the use of the internet to support terrorist activities.

Previous pilot projects for the monitoring and surveillance of internet data have been followed up. During these initial projects, problems arose concerning issues like finding common ground between monitoring and surveillance and how these activities can be coordinated. These problems are still being dealt with. Maintaining these activities will give us more experience, enabling us to identify trends on the internet and take appropriate operational action. Next year, we will examine the experience and knowledge gained in order to decide to what extent and in what ways these activities should be carried out on a permanent basis.

The National Cybercrime Reporting Centre, which collects reports of radical and terrorist utterances on the internet, now has a new website. Other websites contain links giving the internet user direct access to the reporting centre's new website. It is hoped that this will increase the number of relevant reports, thereby helping the authorities keep track of the problem and take appropriate action.

A procedure for blocking radical and terrorist websites is also being developed – a product of the current coalition agreement to ban the transmission of certain messages and information. We are also seeking other ways to make certain online content less prominent, such as examining to what extent alternative content can be provided. The Minister for Housing, Communities and Integration is supporting initiatives from the Muslim community to disseminate knowledge on the internet and join in the debate on the position of Islam in the Netherlands.

To combat the use of the internet for radical and terrorist purposes, the Netherlands is cooperating with other countries in bilateral contacts and in the EU project 'Check the Web'.

⁴ House of Representatives, 2006-2007 session, 29 754, no. 95

This project aims to monitor open sources on the internet and exchange the information found.

4. Effective organisation and instruments

Person-specific approach

In a letter to the House of 10 April 2007,⁵ accompanying the report on the *CT Infobox* by the supervisory committee on the intelligence and security services, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations promised to inform the House further about the person-specific approach. In the meantime, an initial evaluation of this approach has been made – reason enough to examine it in more detail in this report.

In a separate letter to the House, we will look more closely at the authorities' powers and accountability for the person-specific approach, and its legal basis.

Objective

The person-specific approach aims to maintain surveillance of suspected terrorists in such a way that it becomes clear to these persons and those around them that they are the subject of official interest. The goal is to prevent the individual from playing any part in terrorism-related activities by making him or her unusable as a terrorist operative. Subjects of the person-specific approach include persons who have been acquitted in Dutch courts but who – in the opinion of the partners in the Counterterrorism Information Centre (*CT-infobox*) – still pose a terrorist threat.

Procedure

CT-infobox is a cooperative project of the AIVD, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the National Police Services Agency (KLPD), the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), and the Public Prosecution Service. It falls under the direct responsibility of the AIVD. *CT-infobox* supports the fight against terrorism by serving as a repository for information on terrorist networks and persons with possible links to terrorism. By comparing information collected by the participating services, *CT-infobox* can produce a swift analysis and assessment of the situation.

⁵ House of Representatives, 2006-2007 session, 29 924 and 29 754, no. 16

The results of the assessment serve as the basis for *CT-infobox*'s recommendations, which may involve one or more of the following measures:

- a) monitoring/consulting of systems;
- b) taking action under criminal law;
- c) taking action under immigration law;
- d) undertaking an intelligence investigation
- e) undertaking person-specific intervention.

On 20 March 2007, the House of Representatives approved a bill governing the use of administrative measures to protect national security. If the Senate approves this bill and it enters into force, the list above may be augmented with a number of administrative measures.

In drawing up an assessment, *CT-infobox* considers such factors as the scale of the threat posed by the subject, the extent to which the subject is aware of the authorities' interest in him, and the overall appropriateness and efficacy of the person-specific approach. The approach has so far been used only on a limited scale.

Evaluation

Since spring 2005, a shifting array of persons (around fifteen in total) have been the subject of person-specific interventions. The programme, which is carried out by the police, is now in its third year. Experiences in the field have led to adjustments in the approach. Procedures have been drawn up, for instance, allowing mayors to obtain information from the police and the Regional Intelligence Services in order to reach a considered opinion. In 2006, mayors and police chiefs were informed in writing about their role and responsibilities in the event of an intervention.

Working method

Each intervention has been carefully reviewed at local level to determine whether the following objectives have been achieved:

1. Does the subject know that he is being observed by the authorities?
2. Do his family, friends, and neighbours know that he is being observed by the authorities?

3. If so, has this led to any change in the subject's behaviour?

At central level, *CT-infobox* then collates local information and recommendations, draws general conclusions, and recommends improvements. *CT-infobox's* recommendations may include elements not occasioned by any of the cases considered, such as administrative embedding and legal grounding.

Conclusions

The person-specific approach has two goals. First, it aims to send a signal to individuals, networks and organisations that their intended violations of public security and social integrity are known to the authorities, and it aims to make it clear to them and their social surroundings that they are the subjects of official preventive action.

Second, the approach ultimately aims to make subjects cease their activities, leave their organisations, or become less attractive as members of those organisations.

The first goal is undeniably being achieved. This is clear from the subjects' responses, which include complaints to the local police, lawyers' letters, and lawsuits to force an end to the approach.

It is difficult to establish definitely whether the second goal is being achieved. Factual evidence is difficult to obtain.

The evaluation of the person-specific approach has led to the following recommendations:

1. The approach should be brought to the attention of all the operational services concerned.
2. Improvement is needed in the quality, timeliness, and frequency of information sharing between regional and national authorities, and among the various central authorities (*CT-infobox* and its partners).
3. Operations require appropriate underpinning and justification.
4. Other counterterrorism partners (such as municipal executives, the Royal Military and Border Police, and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service) should be involved in carrying out the person-specific approach.
5. We need to examine whether the approach can be widened to include positive measures.

The recommendations in the evaluation report have been acted upon by the members of the person-specific approach control group.

Action Plan for Border Controls

In the first progress report on the Action Plan for Border Controls,⁶ the House was informed of the status of the measures to improve border controls outlined in the Plan. In the latest reporting period, some measures have been taken.

The Government, for instance, has decided that the Royal Military and Border Police, Customs and the Seaport Police should carry out joint patrols on a permanent basis. These services are currently working out the specifics for the implementation of the joint patrols. The agreements made will be laid down in a voluntary agreement or covenant. The Government is also in the process of drawing up risk analyses for three transport subsectors: cruise ships, pleasure sailing, and private aviation. The analyses should be complete in the spring.

International cooperation on border controls

As previous progress reports have pointed out, the EU agency FRONTEX is responsible for coordinating member states' joint endeavours to manage the movement of persons across the EU's external borders. FRONTEX helps the member states train national border guards; it carries out risk analyses; and it provides technical and operational assistance when member states require it. In the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 19 and 20 April 2007, FRONTEX submitted a proposal to develop a European patrol network on the EU's southern maritime borders in cooperation with the member states. Creating the patrol network will be a step-by-step process. This patrol network will become an important cog in a planned surveillance system for the EU's southern maritime borders (and eventually perhaps the EU's entire external maritime frontier). These initiatives resulted from two feasibility studies commissioned by FRONTEX to ascertain whether this form of border surveillance is technically and operationally feasible. Wherever possible, the European patrol network will make use of the existing technical infrastructure and cooperative links between member states. The strength of the European patrol network lies in uniting existing national activities.

⁶ House of Representatives, 2006-2007 session, 30 315, no. 4

CBRN terrorism

The threat assessment drawn up in spring 2007 by the intelligence services found a slight but real chance that a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack could take place in the Netherlands. The same assessment was made in 2006.

This assessment has led us to conclude that – given the disproportionate potential impact of such an attack – the counterterrorism services need to coordinate their CBRN operations. Consequently, the services are continuing their efforts to make potential CBRN targets more secure. In addition to their focus on potential chemical and nuclear targets, the services are turning their attention to sites where CBRN research takes place, such as hospitals, laboratories, and universities. They are also working to make the police and border control services more effective in detecting CBRN weapons. The home-made explosives project that started last year aims to identify readily available raw materials (for making these explosives) and to reach agreements with the suppliers and producers concerning their availability and ingredients. The home-made explosives project team is working closely with the European Commission, which is planning a similar project. Finally, the counterterrorism services are working to strengthen their CBRN response capability, ensuring an appropriate reaction if a CBRN incident should occur.

The System of Special Units

As the House was previously informed, on 1 July 2006, the new System of Special Units came into force, and the Special Intervention Service (DSI) was established within the National Police Services Agency (KLPD). Since then, the System of Special Units and the DSI have both yielded valuable experience. The System of Special Units will be evaluated in early 2008.

Legislation

On 1 February 2007, a new Act entered into force: the Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Offences (Extension of Powers) Act. The Government is currently examining how it can follow through on the promises made to the House concerning the application of some of the Act's provisions.

5. Security measures

Counterterrorism Alert System

The development and expansion of the Counterterrorism Alert System (ATb) is now almost complete. On 1 July 2007, the following sectors will be connected to the system:

- Airports
- Seaports
- Railways
- City and regional public transport
- Financial
- Nuclear
- Electricity
- Gas
- Oil
- Chemicals
- Drinking water
- Tunnels and water defences
- Public events
- Hotels

The public events and hotel sectors are obviously not part of the vital infrastructure, but they are susceptible to terrorist attacks. Public places such as hotels and conference centres, often crowded with people, do not fall neatly into one of the other sectors. Consequently, we are drawing up a separate cross-sector threat analysis for them. The alert level in these sectors depends on standard security measures, unless incidental threats arise.

Firm agreements have been reached with all the sectors about the specific measures associated with changes to the threat level, and training exercises take place on a regular basis. The two-year-old development path has thus come to an end, and the Counterterrorism Alert System is now a standard instrument in the fight against terrorism. The system is managed by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and depends on professional cooperation between the intelligence services, ministries, provinces, municipalities, police forces, and the market sector. To improve this cooperation – following

the first series of meetings in 2006 – a second series of regional meetings have been held in Rotterdam, Almelo, Haarlem, and Amsterdam.

As announced in previous progress reports, the time has come to evaluate the performance of the Counterterrorism Alert System. The Court of Audit will carry out this evaluation and report on it in 2008.

Counterterrorism and the market sector

In late 2006, the Government published a booklet and set of guidelines entitled *Wat kan uw bedrijf ondernemen tegen terrorisme?* ('What can your business do about terrorism?'). Many businesses have ordered it through the special internet site: nederlandtegenterrorisme.nl/bedrijven. This website has been augmented with a decision tree, which shows businesses what they can do to help prevent a terrorist threat or attack.

The guidelines and booklet have been widely distributed. Key potential partners are being reached by way of presentations at conferences and through meetings and regional crime prevention platforms involving the police, municipalities, and businesses. Businesses learn about the guidelines via such channels. In April and May 2006, the market sector's contribution to counterterrorism was highlighted on 16 websites and 24 industry periodicals. And in late 2006, the guidelines and booklet were publicised in several industry periodicals.⁷ In 2007, the issue of counterterrorism was broached at various trade fairs for industries that could be targets or unwittingly provide information, services or products to terrorists. In March and April 2007, businesses were also reached by television and radio advertisements.

Surveillance and protection

A number of new security measures are being developed to promote professionalism and innovation in the Surveillance and Protection System. These include mobile camera supervision, 'extra secure dwellings', and infrastructural measures. At the World Forum Park, a core area of The Hague's International Zone, for instance, a security plan is being developed by the Surveillance and Protection Coordinator in cooperation with the municipality of The Hague, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning

⁷ See letter from Minister of Justice of 23 May 2007, House of Representatives, 2006-2007 session, no. 99

and the Environment. If security is addressed at the structural planning stage, it is unlikely to be a stumbling block when construction begins. Security measures can thus be integrated into construction projects creatively and aesthetically, making the International Zone a safe and pleasant place to live and work.

Another way of promoting professionalism in the Surveillance and Protection System is to strengthen cooperation with surveillance and protection partners and raise their awareness of security matters. Joint training courses have been developed for this purpose, and regional meetings are held on a regular basis.

Protecting civil aviation

This summer, the House will receive a separate report concerning progress on the implementation of the recommendations of the Oord Committee (established to investigate access security at Schiphol Airport).

6. Emergency response

Crisis management in response to a terrorist threat

We have informed you previously that the crisis management structure departs from the standard hierarchy in a number of respects during a terrorist emergency or potential emergency. These differences are explained in the revised version of the National Handbook for Decision-Making in Crisis Situations, soon to be distributed. The authorities concerned have since made more detailed arrangements, which will be discussed in a manual describing the organisational structure of national crisis management in a terrorist emergency.

Exercises

On 6 March 2007, an exercise was held with the Air Operations and Control Station of the Royal Netherlands Air Force to review the 'renegade procedure',⁸ which is used to evaluate air-bound threat situations and decide on a course of action.

⁸ Ministerial Order 5348913/505 of 20 April 2005, 'entailing the provision of military assistance to protect Dutch air space and deploy defence resources against air-based terrorist threats'.

On 21 March 2007, a Special Units exercise was held in the Twente region to test the effectiveness of both the Special Intervention Service's operational activities and the administrative chain of command. The exercise was part of a larger counterterrorism exercise, involving cooperation between local police and authorities in the Netherland and their counterparts in the German states of Lower Saxony and North Rhine Westphalia. This exercise represented the first test of the arrangements made under the Treaty of Enschede.

One of the pillars of an effective Counterterrorism Alert System is an extensive programme of drills and exercises. Each sector involved has its own ATb exercise cycle, consisting of a workshop, a tabletop exercise to practise decision-making procedures, and an operational exercise in which measures are carried out in practice. The first operational ATb exercises, for the railways and drinking water sectors, were held earlier this year. The railways sector exercise, which was held at Eindhoven station, was organised in cooperation with Dutch Railways, ProRail, and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. The drinking water sector exercise, which was held at four plants in the Randstad, was organised by the Association of Dutch Water Companies and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. The results of both exercises have been rated by all the participants as positive.

In June, an operational exercise will be staged for the airport sector. And in the autumn, operational exercises will be held for the gas, electricity and nuclear sectors. Next April, a tabletop exercise will be held for the financial sector. And throughout the year, workshops will be held for the 'newest' sectors.

Minister of Justice

Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations